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EXTRAJUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: THREE OBJECTIONS AND
RESPONSES
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON*
Recent cases such as Flores, Kimel and Garrett highlight the fact
that the most important question regarding judicial supremacy
focuses on the proper degree of deference between the branches
rather than the possibility of extralegal defiance of the Court.
Extrajudicial interpretation of the Constitution has often been
criticized as problematic, insufficient, and not authoritative.
Although it is widely accepted that nonjudicial actors can and do
interpret the Constitution, many constitutional theorists hold to a
theory of judicial supremacy that argues that the Supreme Court is
the ultimate, authoritative interpreter of the Constitution. This
Article critically examines three of the most prominent objections
to extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, and corollary
defenses of judicial supremacy, and finds each inadequate. The
three objections are that extrajudicial constitutional interpretation
is 1) anarchic, 2) irrational, and 3) tyrannical. Each posits a
corresponding virtue of judicial supremacy in terms of 1) the
settlement function of the courts, 2) the deliberative function of the
courts, and 3) the countermajoritarian function of the courts. This
Article offers analytical and empirical responses to these critiques
of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, suggesting reasons
why such interpretation should be regarded as more authoritative
and deserving of greater deference by the courts. These arguments
have implications not only for debates over judicial supremacy per
se, but also for the related debate over the proper scope of judicial
review.
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A higher law background runs deep in our constitutional
thinking. Whether the record of "eternal and immutable" principles
is supreme due to "their own intrinsic excellence"' or as the product
of conscious and positive acts of "higher lawmaking,"'2 the
Constitution is understood to stand above and against politics, a legal
constraint on the power of democracy and elected officials. The
judiciary emerges naturally from this perspective as an essential
guardian of the constitutional order. By issuing authoritative
interpretations of the Constitution, the judiciary, and especially the
Supreme Court, is thought to circumscribe the sphere of politics with
legal norms and ensure that fundamental principles are respected.3
Constitutions, it is thought, require a single, authoritative interpreter,
subject to neither popular pressure nor electoral instability.
Constitutional government requires judicial supremacy.
4
The Supreme Court itself has been a primary exponent of this
argument. In 1803 Chief Justice John Marshall laid the legal roots for
more recent arguments by joining the claim that the Constitution is
1. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN
CONSITrrTIONAL LAW 4-5 (1955).
2. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 266 (1991).
3. But see Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism: Toward a Theory of State
Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 875 (1999) ("[T]he higher law tradition of
the U.S. Constitution is less central to the state constitutional experience.").
4. See CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 24 (2d ed. 1932) ("The judiciary has the sole right to place an authoritative
interpretation upon the fundamental written law."). For present purposes, "judicial
supremacy" is understood as the view that the courts should take the leading and ultimate
role in authoritatively settling constitutional meaning and resolving constitutional disputes
and need show little deference to the constitutional reasoning of other actors, even as
other actors should show strong deference to the constitutional reasoning of the courts.
774 [Vol. 80
EXTRA JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
the "fundamental and paramount law of the nation" with the
declaration that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."5 "The Constitution is
either a superior paramount law"6 subject to judicial interpretation
and application, or it is "absurd. '7 Marshall tempered those strong
words, since it was clear in the context of the time that other political
institutions were also active in interpreting the Constitution and that
those interpretations were broadly accepted as authoritative.' He
concluded his opinion more modestly, arguing that surely "the
framers of the [C]onstitution contemplated that instrument as a rule
for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature" and that
judges could not in good faith "close their eyes to the Constitution,
and see only the law."9
In the late twentieth century, the Justices of the Supreme Court
abandoned such tempering statements. In 1958, Chief Justice Earl
Warren, for a unanimous Court, provided his own gloss on the
judicial duty to "say what the law is." To those who questioned the
judicial authority to define constitutional meaning, the Chief Justice
instructed that "it is only necessary to recall some basic constitutional
propositions which are settled doctrine."'" The Marbury v. Madison
decision "declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution" and
therefore "the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the
land." Over the next fifteen years, the Court further explained not
only to the state governments but also to the Congress and the
President that it was the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution"
who could not share the power to interpret the Constitution with any
5. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803).
6. Id
7. Id.
8. See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONsTrruTION IN CONGRESS (1997)
(discussing early constitutional interpretation).
9. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
10. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958). Chief Justice Warren orally presented the
Court's per curiam opinion. The opinion was largely written, however, by Justice William
Brennan. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 295-96 (1983).
11. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
Cooper can be read narrowly or broadly. Read narrowly, Cooper is fully consistent with
Marbury's principles in asserting the binding quality of judicial decisions in the context of
Article III cases and controversies. Read broadly, Cooper goes beyond Marbury in
making the Court the ultimate guardian of constitutional principles. Both readings can
find some grounding in Cooper and subsequent cases. I am less concerned with what
exactly the Court meant in Cooper, however, than with the Court's and commentators'
increasing preference for judicial over extrajudicial interpretations of the Constitution.
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other branch of government.'" In a series of recent cases, the Court
has again reminded Congress that if it "could define its own powers
by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would
the Constitution be 'superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means.' ,,13 The "Constitution is preserved best when each
part of the government respects both the Constitution and the proper
actions and determinations of the other branches," in particular
current judicial precedent. 4 Judicial supremacy is an essential
component of the Court's recent activity in limiting congressional
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
Academic commentators have been less explicit in their defense
of judicial supremacy per se, and like the Court have often embedded
arguments in favor of judicial supremacy within arguments favoring
judicial review or judicial activism. 6 Although the proposition of
judicial supremacy has been subject to more critical examination in
recent years, 7 judicial supremacy continues to attract adherents.18
12. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (the executive branch);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969) (Congress); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
211 (1962) (state government).
13. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997). In Flores, the Court readily
equated congressional disagreement with judicial interpretations of the Constitution as
congressional alteration of the Constitution. Similarly, in rejecting the applicability of the
political question doctrine to a legislative apportionment case, the Court equated
constitutional rights with the judicial interpretation and protection of them, suggesting
that only unimportant matters could be entrusted to nonjudicial resolution. Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) ("The right to vote is too important in our free society to be
stripped of judicial protection by such an interpretation of Article I.").
14. Flores, 521 U.S. at 535-36. This view has also been cited in support of judicial
review of contested congressional powers. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616
n.7 (2000) ("No doubt the political branches have a role in interpreting and applying the
Constitution, but ever since Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the
constitutional text.").
15. Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,365 (2001) ("[I]t is the responsibility of this
Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees."); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) ("The ultimate interpretation and determination of
the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial
Branch.") (citing Flores); Flores, 521 U.S. at 529.
16. See, for example, sources cited in infra notes 248-64. "Judicial activism" can be
understood as the view that the courts should show relatively little deference to political
actors in exercising the power of judicial review and should aggressively strike down the
acts of other government officials that the courts reasonably believe to be
unconstitutional.
17. See, e.g., SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 109-
26 (1992) (denying that any single interpreter is supreme); ROBERT A. BURT, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONFtCr 353-75 (1992) (same); NEAL E. DEVINS, SHAPING
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 157-62 (1996) (same); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DIALOGUES 231-74 (1992) (same); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTrrTUTIONAL FArrH 27-37
(1988) (examining "Protestant" forms of interpretation); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
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The Court has strongly asserted it. 9 The casebook method of the law
schools implicitly treats it as true.20 The popular press assumes it.2'
When it has been publicly challenged, prominent law professors,
editorialists, and elite lawyers have rushed to defend judicial
supremacy.22
Focusing on a significant aspect of constitutional practice and the
theory of constitutional government, the debate over judicial
supremacy is important in its own terms. The debate may also
provide a useful and different perspective on the central concern of
constitutional theory in the twentieth century, the legitimacy and
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS x-xi (1999) (denying that any single
interpreter is supreme); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 905, 905-06 (1990) (examining the President as a challenger to judicial supremacy);
Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional
Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401, 413 (1986) (denying that any single interpreter is supreme);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEO. Li. 217, 219-20 (1994) (examining the President as a challenger to
judicial supremacy).
18. Bruce Ackerman appears to be a somewhat surprisingly adherent to judicial
supremacy. Despite his interest in "constitutional politics," Ackerman sharply
distinguishes between constitutional interpretation and constitutional amendment. By
categorizing political engagement with the Constitution as examples of "higher
lawmaking," he preserves judicial supremacy in the realm of interpretation. 1
ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 261-65.
19. See cases cited in supra notes 5-6 and 9-14.
20. Neal E. Devins, Correspondence: The Stuff of Constitutional Law, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 1795, 1795-97 (1992); see also J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of
Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 983-84 (1998) (positing that the casebook
method canonizes the Supreme Court's opinions).
21. Most notoriously, in reporting the results of a survey testing the general public's
understanding of the Constitution, the Washington Post noted that six of ten respondents
"correctly" identified the Supreme Court as the "final authority on constitutional change."
Ruth Marcus, Constitution Confuses Most Americans: Public Ill-Informed on U.S.
Blueprint, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1987, at A13. More recently, the Post's judicial reporter
explained to readers that the Court has "the last word. The Justices are the final arbiter of
what is in the Constitution." Joan Biskupic, The Shrinking Docket, WASH. POST, Mar. 18,
1996, at A15. Similarly, a recent academic survey of public knowledge of the Supreme
Court approvingly reported that sixty percent of the respondents identified the Court as
having "the ultimate 'say' on the Constitution." James L. Gibson et al., Public Knowledge
of the United States Supreme Court 4 (2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://artsci.wustl.edu/-legit/Courtknowledge.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2002) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
22. See, e.g., Michael Kinsley, Meese's Stink Bomb, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1986, at
A19 (denouncing Edwin Meese's challenge to judicial supremacy); Anthony Lewis, Law
or Power?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1986, at A23 (same); Stuart Taylor Jr., Liberties Union
Denounces Meese, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1986, at A17 (reporting criticisms of Meese);
Murray Waas & Jeffrey Toobin, Meese's Power Grab: The Constitutional Crisis No One
Noticed, NEW REPUBLIc, May 19, 1986, at 15,15 (same).
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proper scope of judicial review. Recent works by Mark Tushnet z and
Jeremy Waldron, 4 for example, have argued against the power of
judicial review itself on the grounds that the deliberations of other
political actors and institutions should be regarded as equally
valuable and authoritative. Even if we do not ultimately accept such
strong conclusions, the reconsideration of extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation should force us to clarify why we value judicial review
and how it should be used.
As recent decisions such as City of Boerne v. Flores,25 Dickerson
v. United States,26 and United States v. Morrison27 emphasize, the most
important implications of the debate over judicial supremacy may
relate to the proper degree of deference the branches should show to
one another's constitutional judgments rather than to the problems of
extralegal defiance of judicial orders by executive-branch officials
highlighted in cases such as Cooper v. Aaron or Ex parte
Merryman.29 The question may be less whether the Court has the
authority to settle justiciable cases than how the Court should settle
such cases, and how nonjudicial institutions should approach non-
justiciable (and not yet litigated) controversies. Whereas
constitutional theory motivated by the problem of judicial review has
largely focused on the substantive problem of how the courts should
interpret the Constitution, the debate over judicial supremacy focuses
more squarely on the institutional problem of who should make the
final decision concerning contested interpretations. In the aftermath
of the inconclusive hermeneutical debates of the past two decades,
the institutional question of who should answer the hard questions of
constitutional meaning becomes particularly important since the
answers themselves will undoubtedly be politically and intellectually
controversial.
23. See generally TUSHNET, supra note 17, at 154-76 (arguing that the electoral
process allows for better interpretation of the Constitution).
24. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, LAWv AND DISAGREEMENT 282-312 (1999)
(arguing that judicial review violates precepts of liberalism).
25. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
26. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
27. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
28. 358 U.S. 1, 9-17 (1958) (responding to a governor's refusal to obey a court order
to desegregate Little Rock schools).
29. 17 F. Cas. 144, 152-53 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). In the Merryman case, Abraham
Lincoln refused a judicial order to produce a prisoner. Id.; see also Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch




This Article will critically examine three prominent objections to
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation." The primary normative
objections to the authority of extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation can be framed in three ways: 1) it's anarchic, 2) it's
irrational, and 3) it's tyrannical. Each of these objections to
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation posits a corresponding
virtue of judicial supremacy: 1) the settlement function of judicial
interpretation, 2) the deliberative function of the courts, and 3) the
countermajoritarian function of the courts. Although each of these
objections to extrajudicial constitutional interpretation has some
force, each is deeply problematic and ultimately insufficient to justify
a strong form of judicial supremacy. Each of these objections to
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation can be met by a structurally
similar response. With respect to each of these objections, the critics
of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation overstate the advantages
of judicial supremacy, for example, by assuming the Court will behave
in a strongly countermajoritarian fashion and understate the ways in
which extrajudicial constitutional interpretation possesses the
characteristics that the critics value, such as a concern with
incorporating diverse interests. My responses to these objections will
demonstrate the ways in which objections make empirical, analytical,
and normative errors in evaluating the relative performance of
judicial and nonjudicial actors. Active judicial intervention in
constitutional debates and strong deference by political actors to
judicial interpretations are not necessary for achieving constitutional
order or preserving constitutional principles.
The Article begins with a clarification of the terms of the debate
and the contours of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, a
necessary first step given the shifting sands of the debate. Each of the
subsequent parts examines a particular objection to extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation. Part II demonstrates that the judiciary
cannot settle constitutional disputes as its proponents contend and
that judicial supremacy is not necessary to insure constitutional order.
Part III challenges the assumption that the judiciary is particularly
deliberative and contends that nonjudicial actors provide useful
perspectives on constitutional meaning. Part IV questions the
countermajoritarian capacity of the courts and the assumption that
30. It should be emphasized that the objections to extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation presented here are constructed from a variety of sources to highlight
common concerns about nonjudicial actors. As such, the objections are presented in a
relatively strong form, and individual authors would likely present more nuanced and
qualified views.
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nonjudicial institutions act in a relentlessly majoritarian fashion. This
Article concludes by noting the positive democratic virtues of
recognizing authoritative constitutional debates outside the courts.
Judicial interpretation of the Constitution clearly has its place, but the
critique of judicial "activism" should better incorporate an
appreciation of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation.
I. WHO INTERPRETS THE CONSTITUTION?
Before addressing the arguments for and against judicial
supremacy and extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, the object
of debate itself should first be clarified. The primary aim of this
section is to distinguish a critique of judicial supremacy from a
critique of judicial review. Extrajudicial constitutional interpretation
can take many forms, and those various forms are not all equally
controversial. The crucial issue is how much deference various
political actors should show to the constitutional reasoning of other
actors in the political system and who should have the lead role in
resolving controversies regarding the meaning of the Constitution.
For advocates of judicial supremacy, the courts should take the lead
in resolving constitutional disputes and need show little deference to
the constitutional reasoning of other actors, even as those other
actors should show strong deference to the judiciary.31 Critics of
judicial supremacy support a broader range of positive alternatives,
from an interbranch dialogue over constitutional meaning32 to
executive autonomy in constitutional interpretation,33 but are united
in the view that nonjudicial actors should be active constitutional
interpreters whose interpretations are entitled to respect and
deference from the courts.
Extrajudicial constitutional interpretation comes in many forms,
and so do theories of the appropriate hierarchy of the various
potential interpreters. At the outset, judicial supremacy should be
distinguished from judicial exclusivity in constitutional interpretation.
Judicial supremacy merely requires that the Court be the "ultimate"
31. For Ronald Dworkin, for example, the courts alone act on constitutional principle,
and therefore have little reason to defer to the political will of the other branches.
RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33 (1985). From a different perspective,
Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer emphasize the deference that the political
branches should show the constitutional interpretations made by the judiciary. Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1359,1362 (1997).
32. FISHER, supra note 17, at 3 ("[Constitutional law] is a process in which all three
branches converge and interact with their separate interpretations.").
33. Paulsen, supra note 17, at 222 (describing an "interpretive tug-of-war").
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or "authoritative" constitutional interpreter, not that the judiciary be
the exclusive interpreter of the Constitution 4 The judiciary may be
the supreme interpreter, but it is not the only one. Most obviously, if
least authoritatively, private citizens offer their own interpretations of
the Constitution all of the time. Some academics make a living at it.
Private interpreters at the bar and in the press rush into constitutional
battles before the Court and evaluate and criticize the Court after it
has rendered its opinion. Perhaps more importantly, government
officials routinely, if often implicitly, render constitutional judgments
in the absence of judicial deliberation on the issue. Congress, for
example, can be regarded as implicitly asserting an interpretation of
its own constitutional authority every time that it passes legislation.
In many cases, those constitutional judgments never come under
serious judicial scrutiny. The Court's own political question doctrine
asserts that at least some of those judgments should never come
under judicial scrutiny3 The Constitution delegates at least some
34. Ronald Dworkin has recently been moved to address the "institutional questions"
of "who must ask these questions" about how the Constitution should be read and "whose
answer should be taken to be authoritative." RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 34
(1996). Having raised this "mysterious matter," however, Dworkin promptly dismisses it
as of no practical importance. Id. at 34-35. This "interpretive authority is already
distributed by history" and "the most straightforward interpretation of American
constitutional practice shows that our judges have final interpretive authority." 1d; see
also RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 120 (1994) ("For all practical purposes, the
federal courts, and finally the Supreme Court, have the last word about what rights the
Constitution affirms and protects, and what the national and state governments therefore
cannot do.").
35. See generally Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (discussing the
applicability of the political question doctrine to a challenge of a federal judge's
impeachment and trial in the Senate); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that a suit by members of Congress to
prevent the President from rescinding a treaty is a non-justiciable political question);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962) (discussing the applicability of the political
question doctrine to a case challenging a Tennessee apportionment scheme); Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 457-60 (1939) (Black, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that the notification process for a constitutional amendment is a
political question); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (arguing that whether a
new state constitution has been adopted is a political question). The justification for and
contours of the political question doctrine remain controversial, and one implication of the
critique of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation is that the doctrine should be sharply
reduced and perhaps abandoned entirely. Moreover, even while recognizing the existence
of the political question doctrine, the Court has asserted its own authority to define its
scope and determine any particular controversy that falls within its confines. It remains,
that is, a judge-made doctrine and reinforces judicial supremacy even as the Court
exercises restraint in any given case. See also Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and
Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 413-14
(1997) ("The political question doctrine is best understood as a voluntary allocation of
interpretive responsibility by the Court to the political branches.").
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interpretive questions to nonjudicial institutions, such as the
congressional authority through impeachment and trial to define the
meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors."36  Even where the
judiciary is active and retains the ultimate authority to settle the issue,
nonjudicial actors may well engage in a "dialogue" with the Court
over the most appropriate interpretation of the Constitution,
encouraging the Court to adjust its doctrines to accommodate other
views.37 As long as nonjudicial actors recognize the superior authority
of the courts, extrajudicial constitutional interpretation per se need
not challenge judicial supremacy. Nonjudicial actors may express
their own "individual opinions" about the meaning of the
Constitution, but judicial supremacy requires that the actions of the
government strictly adhere to the meaning of the Constitution
favored by the courts, even when those actions may not be reviewed
by the courts.
38
Theories regarding the appropriate hierarchy of interpreters
come in several varieties 9 The first, judicial supremacy, has already
been noted. The other two branches of the national government are
likewise obvious candidates for supremacy, and theories of executive
and legislative supremacy in constitutional interpretation have been
suggested, though they have not attracted serious political suppor 0
A theory of state supremacy was extensively developed in the
antebellum period, but has found few adherents since the Civil War.41
The most significant historical and theoretical alternative to judicial
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
37. For important statements of the "dialogue" model of constitutional interpretation,
see DEVINS, supra note 17, at 41-55 (examining the dialogue between the branches in
determining the constitutional questions of segregation, minimum wages, the legislative
veto, and religion); FISHER, supra note 17, at 233-47 (discussing the manner in which the
actions of all three branches affect constitutional interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Philip P. Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 28-29 (1994) (arguing
that the different branches of government cooperate and compete to shape responses from
one another); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 580-
81 (1993) (arguing that the legislative and executive branches impact the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution).
38. JAMEs BUCHANAN, Inaugural Address, (Mar. 4, 1857), in 10 THE WORKS OF
JAMES BUCHANAN 106-107 (John Bassett Moore ed., 1910) ("To [the Supreme Court's]
decision, in common with all good citizens, I shall cheerfully submit, whatever this may be,
though it has ever been my individual opinion that" the people of a territory may
determine whether to accept slavery when ready for admission as a state.).
39. For overviews, see Gant, supra note 35, at 366-89; Murphy, supra note 17, at 406-
12.
40. See Gant, supra note 35, at 373-83.
41. See, e.g., JOHN C. CALHOUN, Draft Report on Federal Relations, in 11 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 485, 488-510 (Clyde N. Wilson ed., 1978) (elaborating on
the compact theory of state sovereignty).
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supremacy, however, is departmentalism, or coordinate construction,
which denies that any single interpreter is supreme.42 Instead each
branch, or department, of government has an equal authority to
interpret the Constitution in the context of conducting its duties.
Departmentalism can be linked to a form of the political question
doctrine such that each branch of government has its own, non-
overlapping set of interpretive responsibilities. Spheres of
interpretive authority are divided up according to the particular
institutional competencies of the different branches, and each branch
is supreme within its own interpretive sphere.43 In other forms,
departmentalism allows for the possibility of conflict between
different, formally equal constitutional interpreters. A nonjudicial
actor may choose not to defer to judicial reasoning and instead make
"decisions according to her own, rather than the court's,
constitutional interpretation. '"I
The range of alternatives to judicial supremacy should also
emphasize that opposition to judicial supremacy can be distinguished
from opposition to judicial review per se. Of course, in practice,
political arguments over judicial supremacy are usually motivated by
particular judicial rulings, and as a consequence debates over judicial
review and judicial supremacy are often mingled. For a few
Jeffersonians, for example, doubts about judicial supremacy led
directly to doubts about the legitimacy of judicial review itself.45 On
the other hand, John Marshall's justification for judicial review can be
42. Edward Corwin probably coined the term "departmentalism" in the aftermath of
the Court-packing controversy. EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 69
(1938). The concept, however, was widely voiced at the founding and intermittently
asserted throughout American history. See Paulsen, supra note 17, at 228-40,245-50,262-
65 (discussing the concept of departmentalism in the debates of the founders, Lincoln, and
former Supreme Court Justices). Even John Marshall's Marbury opinion articulates a
departmentalist logic. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (stating that
the Constitution is a "rule for the government of the courts, as well as of the legislature").
43. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 17, at 417 ("(A modified version of departmentalism]
lowers the stakes by ascribing different areas of competence .... ([]f widely accepted, this
form of departmentalism would reduce, though not eliminate, conflict between the federal
judiciary, on the one hand, and Congress and/or the presidency on the other.").
44. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 31, at 1362.
45. See, e.g., 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 585 (1802) ("[The] [l]egislature has the exclusive
right to interpret the Constitution in what regards the law-making power, and the Judges
are bound to execute the laws they make."). But see RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE
JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS 66 (1974) ("[Flew Republicans were prepared to deny the right of
the Supreme Court to review for itself an act of Congress.... What [Jefferson] would have
objected to, and what Marshall did not assert, was a claim that the power of review was
solely within the Supreme Court's province, or that the Court's judgment was superior to
that of the other branches.").
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read as an application of orthodox Jeffersonian departmentalist
logic.4 6
As a theoretical matter judicial review and judicial supremacy
should be distinguished. Judicial review refers to "the authority of a
court, when deciding cases, to refuse to give force to an act of a
coordinate branch of government."'47 By contrast, judicial supremacy
refers to the "obligation of coordinate officials not only to obey that
particular [judicial] ruling but to follow its reasoning in future
deliberations." '4 A model of judicial supremacy posits that the Court
does not merely resolve particular disputes involving the litigants
directly before it or elsewhere in the judicial system. It also
authoritatively interprets constitutional meaning. Judicial supremacy
requires deference by other government officials to the constitutional
dictates of the Court, even when other government officials think that
the Court is substantively wrong about the meaning of the
Constitution and in circumstances that are not subject to judicial
review. Likewise, judicial supremacy requires that other
government officials regard judicial opinions as generative, binding
not merely in a particular case, but indicating correct constitutional
principles that may apply in a wide variety of future, not-yet-
contemplated cases.' Indeed, it is this feature of judicial
constitutional reasoning that Abraham Lincoln and his administration
46. See, e.g., ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 99-101 (1989); David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept of
Judicial Review, 42 DUKE L.J. 279, 333 (1992); see also CORWIN, supra note 42, at 6
(distinguishing a "juristic conception" of judicial review in which the courts "have peculiar
competence" to interpret the Constitution from a "political or departmental conception"
of judicial review).
47. WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
265 (2d ed. 1995).
48. Id.
49. See John Harrison, Coordination, the Constitution, and the Binding Effect of
Judicial Opinions 22 (Aug. 7, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). As
many recognize, the Court does not even formally have the "final" word on constitutional
disputes, for constitutional amendments to "overrule" judicial decisions can be and have
been adopted. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 17, at 201-05. Normative objections to
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation have implications for amendment politics as
well, calling into question whether nonjudicial actors can be entrusted with the
responsibility to alter as well as interpret the "higher law." This implication has been
made more explicit in the context of state constitutions, where judicial rulings are more
rarely final in fact. See Reed, supra note 3, at 875.
50. See, e.g., Michael Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule
of Law: Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15
CARDOZO L. REv. 137,173 (1993) ("[W]ith respect to the duty to abide by valid Supreme
Court precedents, the proper obligations of the [P]resident could be said to be ... similar
to those of a judge who sits on a federal court of appeals.").
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denied in the context of Dred Scott v. Sandford." Although the
Taney Court may have denied the citizenship of Dred Scott for the
purposes of jurisdiction in a federal lawsuit, the Lincoln
administration felt free to ignore the Court's opinion in order to
recognize black citizenship in the context of the regulation of coastal
ships,52 passports53 and patents,54 as well as to pass laws abolishing
slavery in the territories 55 and the District of Columbia 6 It is this
authority to say what the Constitution means-not merely with
refusing to enforce laws that conflict with the Constitution-that has
historically been subject to the greatest challenge and which raises the
most interesting questions about the theory and practice of
constitutionalism.
The challenge to judicial supremacy is not a challenge to judicial
review. Because extrajudicial constitutional interpretation is both
realistic and legitimate, one challenge is how to justify the requested
deference by nonjudicial actors to judicial constitutional reasoning.
Another challenge questions the assumption that the Court should
take the lead in defining constitutional meaning and quashing
alternative interpretations. The debate over judicial supremacy
therefore links to the more prominent debate of the past several
decades over "judicial activism" and the proper scope of judicial
review. Whereas that more well-known debate focused on the
question of how to interpret the Constitution and the problems of
distinguishing hard and easy constitutional cases and correctly
deciding the hard cases, the judicial supremacy debate is less
concerned with making hard cases look easy than with examining who
should have the authority to settle those hard cases.57 Within the
confines of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, different
accommodations between judicial and nonjudicial interpreters are
51. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS 396-97, 585-86 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1990) ("refusing to obey [Dred Scott] as a
political rule").
52. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 382, 412 (1862) ("[N]otwithstanding all that was said upon
other subjects, the action of the court was strictly confined to the plea in abatement.").
53. 5 THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 497-98 (Boston, Lee and Shepard 1880).
54. 6 THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 144 (Boston, Lee and Shepard 1880).
55. Abolition of Slavery Act (Territories), ch. 111,12 Stat. 432 (1862).
56. Abolition of Slavery Act (District of Columbia), ch. 54, 12 Stat. 376 (1862).
57. On the distinction of "who interprets" from "how" and "what" to interpret, see
Murphy, supra note 17, at 401-04. See generally TUSHNET, supra note 17, at 6-7 (rejecting
judicial review); WALDRON, supra note 24, at 283-312 (rejecting judicial determination of
rights).
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possible." This Article does not attempt to specify the proper scope
of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, but rather simply
responds to objections that would displace the authority of
nonjudicial actors entirely. In doing so, however, it suggests the
appropriateness of recognizing a relatively strong authority for
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation.
II. FIRST OBJECTION: IT'S ANARCHIC
Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, who have defended
judicial supremacy as necessary to "the settlement function of the
law," have made the most prominent recent objection to extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation.5 9 Alexander and Schauer's analysis
provides a new twist on an old claim-that extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation is anarchic. John Marshall made bolder claims on
behalf of the Court in relation to his opinion in McCulloch v.
Maryland61 than in the earlier Marbury case. Marshall began his
McCulloch opinion by emphasizing the Court's "awful responsibility"
to resolve constitutional disputes.6' The United States, he feared,
suffered from too many constitutional interpreters who might
uncompromisingly press their claims to the point of disunion and
war.62 Constitutional questions, such as those raised in McCulloch,
"must be decided peacefully, or remain a source of hostile legislation,
perhaps of hostility of a still more serious nature," and if such
questions are "to be so decided, by this tribunal alone can the
decision be made."'63 The Chief Justice elaborated on this point in an
58. See generally BURT, supra note 17, at 77-102 (constitutional interpretation must
involve many different institutional participants); FISHER, supra note 17, at 3 (interbranch
dialogue and accommodation); TUSHNET, supra note 17 (eliminate authoritative judicial
interpretation); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 213-19
(1999) (restrict judiciary to areas of interpretive determinacy); Murphy, supra note 17, at
411-16 (separate spheres of interpretive authority).
59. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 31, at 1371 ("[A]n important function of law
is to settle authoritatively what is to be done."). In doing so, the law allows "people to
plan their affairs with reasonable confidence that they can know in advance the legal
consequences of various actions." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Rule of Law, 97 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1, 7-8 (1997). Alexander and Schauer particularly emphasize the ways in which such
foreseeability can encourage social coordination. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 31
at 1371-72.
60. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
61. Id. at 400.
62. See id. at 400-01.
63. Id. at 401. Marshall's argument on behalf of the Court in McCulloch set the stage
for the Court's later effort to peacefully settle a politically contested constitutional issue in
Dred Scott. See Keith E. Whittington, The Road Not Taken: Dred Scott, Constitutional
Law, and Political Questions, 63 1 POL. 365, 377-81 (2001).
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anonymous newspaper defense of his opinion, arguing that "if we
were now making, instead of a controversy, a constitution, where
would this important duty of deciding questions which grow out of
the constitution, and the laws of the union, be safely and wisely
placed?" 64 The Constitution needed a "peaceful and quiet mode" of
interpreting and enforcing the laws.65 The prospect of different state
interpretations of the Constitution raised the anarchy question in
particularly stark terms. In the debates over state nullification of
unconstitutional federal actions, Daniel Webster echoed Marshall's
concerns. He asked his congressional colleagues:
[Could anything be more preposterous than to make a
government of the whole Union, and yet leave its powers
subject, not to one interpretation, but to thirteen, or twenty-
four, interpretations?6 6 [Could such a thing be] fit to be
called a government? No sir. It should not be denominated
a constitution. It should be called, rather, a collection of
topics, for everlasting controversy; heads of debate for a
disputatious people.67
If anarchy were to be avoided, then there must be an ultimate
authoritative constitutional interpreter, in the body of the Supreme
Court.
The anarchy objection has been more recently rehearsed in the
context of interbranch disagreement over constitutional meaning.
When Attorney General Edwin Meese III gave a speech critical of
the Court's declaration of judicial supremacy in the Cooper decision,
the same prospect of anarchy was raised. The denial of judicial
supremacy could "create a situation of enormous chaos," "would
produce anarchy," and "invite[s] anarchy."6  Similarly, Alexander
and Schauer set out to "defend Cooper and its assertions of judicial
64. John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF
MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 208 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
65. Id.
66. 6 CONG. DEB. 78 (1830).
67. Id.
68. Howard Kurtz, Meese's View on Court Rulings Assailed, Defended, WASH. POST,
Oct. 24, 1986, at A12 (quoting Geoffrey Stone); Lewis, supra note 22; see also Paul Brest,
Meese, the Lawman, Calls for Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1986, § 4, at 23 (noting that
"anarchy would prevail if every official and agency were free to disregard the Court's
rulings"); Paul Greenberg, Meese Wants Government of Men, Not of Law, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Nov. 4, 1986, at B7 ("[T]his is to advocate [a] kind of judicial anarchy.");
Taylor, supra note 22 ("Meese's statements... were denounced as an 'invitation to
lawlessness' today by the American Civil Liberties Union .... Laurence Tribe... said,
'Mr. Meese's position represents a grave threat to the rule of law because it proposes a
regime in which... the civilizing hand of a uniform interpretation of the Constitution
crumbles.' ").
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supremacy without qualification."6 9 They note that "an important-
perhaps the important-function of law is its ability to settle
authoritatively what is to be done," a function that is "especially
important" for the Constitution as the highest law.70 "Insofar as the
Constitution is susceptible to divergent views about what it
means[,] ... an important function of the Constitution remains
unserved," as it would have "failed to perform the settlement
function. '71  Moreover, "'Protestantism' in constitutional
interpretation-interpretive anarchy-produces no settled meaning
of the Constitution and thus no settlement of what is to be done with
respect to our most important affairs." 72 Judicial supremacy follows
not because judicial interpretations of the Constitution "are, by
definition, correct, but despite the fact that they may be incorrect."73
The judiciary's commitment to stare decisis suggests that judicial
interpretations of the Constitution will be more stable than
nonjudicial interpretations.74 By contrast, Daniel Webster expressed
the concern of many in fretting over the stability of a constitution
entrusted to "popular bodies.., at liberty, too, then to give a new
construction on every new election of its own members." 75 Law is
intended to overcome disagreement, and judicial supremacy alone
insures that political controversies are settled and political power is
checked.
This objection to extrajudicial constitutional interpretation
overstates the value of constitutional stability, while simultaneously
overestimating the ability of the judiciary to impose constitutional
settlements and underestimating the capacity of nonjudicial actors to
settle constitutional disputes effectively. The settlement function of
the law is a valuable one, but it is not the only value that the
Constitution serves. Moreover, the question of how constitutional
69. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 31, at 1362.
70. Id. at 1377.
71. Id. at 1376-77.
72. Id. at 1379.
73. Id. at 1381.
74. Id. at 1372-73, 1378 n.80 (praising the "existence of a regime of precedential
constraint for courts"); Allan Ides, Judicial Supremacy and the Law of the Constitution, 47
UCLA L. REv. 491, 514 (1999) ("Most importantly, unlike congressional and presidential
interpretations of the Constitution, these judicially created rules are not ad hoc (at least in
principle they are not). Lower federal courts and state courts must follow them in like
cases, and, of equal importance, they will be followed as precedent by the Supreme Court
under the doctrine of stare decisis.").
75. 6 CONG. DEB. 78 (1830); see also HAINES, supra note 4, at 351 (quoting William
Howard Taft) (refusing to submit constitutional questions to "the fitful impulse of a
temporary majority of an electorate").
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meaning can be resolved most effectively is an empirical one.
Although Alexander and Schauer admit that "in that sense, our
argument is empirical and not merely conceptual," nonetheless they
generally insist that their "analysis is neither empirical nor historical"
but rather normative and analytical.76 Unfortunately, their argument
builds too many problematic empirical assumptions into the analysis.
A. The Subtle Vices (and Virtues) of Constitutional Settlements
Alexander and Schauer are clear about the values served by legal
stability, though not very specific about how these abstract values
apply in the constitutional context. Stable law "serves an important
coordination function," inducing "socially beneficial cooperative
behavior and providing solutions to Prisoner's Dilemmas and other
problems of coordination."'  Somewhat surprisingly, however,
Alexander and Schauer provide few examples of what they regard as
analogously beneficial constitutional rules, though they briefly discuss
election rules and free speech rules. Representative democracy
works better if citizens know when, where, and how they can vote,
and vague free speech rules may have a chilling effect on socially
desirable speech.7 8 But how much finality and clarity is needed in the
law in order to facilitate social cooperation? Alexander and Schauer
do not say. The practical choice is not really between order and
chaos, but between different levels and types of stability, and
different mechanisms for securing stability and change. Simply
pointing to the settlement function of the law provides little guidance
for making decisions about the relative interpretive authority of
different political institutions.
Rather surprisingly, Alexander and Schauer are even less clear
on what exactly is required to achieve legal settlement and stability.
At one point, they simply note that "our argument assumes that
76. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 31, at 1377 n.79; id. at 1369. Alexander and
Schauer have recently clarified this point, admitting that "the empirical dimension is one
that cannot be avoided" but shunning any "reliance on the authority of history to answer
the preconstitutional question." Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending
Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 464 (2000). Indeed, Alexander
and Schauer now call for research on "the empirical question that lies at the center of the
debate." Id. at 482 n.78.
77. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 31, at 1371. Having a settled rule specifying that
we should drive on the right side of the road encourages more people to drive than if such
a rule did not exist. See also Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great about
Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 179 (1998) ("Finality is a virtue, on this view,
because endless reconsideration of the same issues is wasteful, unsettling, and possibly
destructive of social peace.").
78. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 31, at 1373.
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Supreme Court decisions provide more clarity than the constitutional
text alone. '79 But surely this is the wrong measure. For one thing,
"clarity" is not the same thing as "stability." Moreover, the
interesting question is not whether a particular constitutional
interpretation provides a clearer rule than the original text alone-
that is almost necessarily true8Q-but whether judicial supremacy
provides more clarity and stability than extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation and whether any such marginal gains in clarity and
stability are worth the costs in terms of accountability and
participation.
Presumably the coordination functions of law require some
degree of clarity (such that individuals know what actions are allowed
and are able to predict the actions of others) and some degree of
stability (such that individuals can predict future behavior) across
some range of potential actions (the more of the law that is settled by
a particular decision then the more coordination can be induced).
How much clarity, stability and scope must constitutional rules have
in order to allow socially beneficial coordination? There are clearly
trade-offs to be made between these and other dimensions of the law.
A very clear and stable law may also be too rigid, hampering rather
than inducing socially beneficial activity.81 Likewise, the substantive
quality of the law may become more important if the law is stable and
broad than if it were flexible and narrow. It is sometimes better to
have no rule than a substantively bad rule. Moreover, a substantively
good but fluid rule may be better than a substantively bad but fixed
rule. These considerations may apply even more strongly in the
constitutional context than in other legal contexts precisely because
constitutional rules can be relatively difficult to change and have
relatively sweeping effects. As Justice Brandeis observed, the rule of
statutory interpretation that "it is more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right" has less force in the
constitutional context.'
79. Id. at 1377 n.79.
80. But see ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 7-17 (1989) (criticizing
the confusion and doubt sown by lawyers); Harrison, supra note 49, at 8 (noting that
"some of the Court's doctrines are fairly countertextual" and thus may produce
confusion).
81. This was very much the question during the Progressive Era and New Deal, when
legal reformers increasingly urged that apparently clear constitutional rules be construed
less rigidly so as to allow adaptation to social change. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 233-36 (2000).




The constitutional text itself often prefers standards to rules. It is
sometimes better for constitutional rules to be relatively unsettled
because it can foster socially beneficial experimentation and allow
political diversity. The founders in fact left a large number of
constitutional issues unsettled, allowing for future constitutional
development rather than seeking to close it off. Alexander and
Schauer implicitly regard this as a design flaw, a "constitutional
stupidity, '83 and avoid any inquiry into why the founders may have
preferred to leave some things undecided.
Even focusing on Alexander and Schauer's example of election
rules, for example, it is striking how much the Constitution left up in
the air. The Constitution does specify a fair number of issues
regarding the qualification, apportionment, and method of selection
of members of Congress. Nonetheless, the Constitution does not seek
to answer such basic questions as the time, place, and manner of
electing federal representatives, the precise apportionment of House
seats within a state, the method of determining a list of eligible
candidates, or the precise qualifications of federal voters, leaving such
matters to the mutable resolutions of diverse institutions. James
Wilson, among others, successfully argued that it would be a mistake
to try to authoritatively settle the qualifications of federal voters
given the wide range of practices and expectations in the various
states.' In the early decades of the republic, the date of federal
elections varied widely from state to state and over time, as did the
method of apportioning House seats and the qualifications of federal
voters.8 5 States experimented with various forms of balloting and
voting before generally settling on the "Australian ballot," a
settlement that might have actually contributed to the reduction in
popular participation in the electoral process. 6 States and political
83. See CONSTITUTIONAL STuPIDITIES/CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 84, 115
(William N. Eskridge Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998). In their contributions to this
volume, however, Schauer (addressing constitutional stupidities) and Alexander
(addressing constitutional tragedies) focus on other issues. See id. at 86 (criticizing the
Constitution's "risk aversion"); id. at 115 (on the inescapability of constitutional
tragedies).
84. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 401 (W.W. Norton 1987) ("It was difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications for
all the States. Unnecessary innovations he thought too should be avoided.").
85. See KENNETH MARTIS, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF U.S. CONGRESSIONAL
DISTRICTS, 1789-1983, at 4-7 (1982); ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE 105-
12 (1987); Edward M. Phillips, Why is Today Election Day?, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3,1992, at 2.
86. MICHAEL E. MCGERR, THE DECLINE OF POPULAR POLITICS 64-66, 207 (1986).
But cf. William E. Dugan & William A. Taggart, The Changing Shape of the American
Political Universe Revisited, 57 J. POL. 469, 477-78 (1995) (finding little effect on voter
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parties continue to experiment with different methods of selecting
candidates for inclusion on the ballot, including primary elections,
party caucuses, and popular petitions. Despite the relative clarity of
the Constitution's rule that senators were to be selected by state
legislatures, that textual settlement also gave way to local
experimentation as states began to submit the choice of senators to
popular vote-a practice later ratified and made uniform by
constitutional amendment.' The lack of constitutional settlement of
these issues would seem to have been a net positive for the
development of American democracy. By contrast, there is reason to
question whether we are well served by the adoption of settled rules
requiring that federal elections be held on the next Tuesday after the
first Monday of November or prohibiting state experimentation with
term limits on federal legislators.'
Even in the context of free speech rules, clear settlements would
require sacrificing other significant values. For example, the Supreme
Court left an avenue open for useful variation in free speech rules
governing obscenity in Miller v. California.89 Although the Miller
Court purported "to formulate standards more concrete than those in
the past," it nonetheless introduced the destabilizing element of
"contemporary [local] community standards" as the appropriate
measure for evaluating whether materials are legally obscene into the
constitutional law governing the regulation of obscene speech while
still awaiting the "concrete legislative efforts" of the states.9 The
Court simultaneously displaced precedent, articulated a still vague
standard for identifying obscene speech, and allowed substantial local
variation in constitutional interpretation by rejecting "fixed, uniform
turnout from adoption of Australian ballot). The Australian ballot is a ballot provided at
public expense with all the candidates listed and distributed only at the polling place to be
marked secretly by the individual voter. MCGERR, supra, at 64.
87. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONsT. amend. XVII, § 1; GEORGE
H. HAYNES, THE ELECTION OF SENATORS 130-152 (1906); William H. Riker, The Senate
and American Federalism, 49 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 452, 468 (1955) ("[T]he Seventeenth
Amendment thus simply acknowledged an already existing situation.").
88. 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
Despite the clarity of the federal rule for date of elections, the states are effectively
circumventing it with loosened absentee ballot rules.
89. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
90. Id. at 20, 24, 25. Even those who are generally sympathetic with the more
concrete Miller standard, however, have nonetheless been critical of aspects of the
substantive rule established in that case. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Speech and
"Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional
Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899, 928-32 (1979) (arguing that "obscenity" in the constitutional




national standards" for a "too big and too diverse" nation.9' Rather
than attempting to create a single, national definition of obscene
material that would itself be adequate to settle all future cases, the
Court merely gave local jurisdictions guidance in searching for their
own best understanding of constitutionally unprotected obscene
speech. Not unreasonably, the Court was willing to tolerate some
chilling effect on speech, as some speakers uncertain of the precise
boundaries of the law restrained themselves so as to avoid legal
entanglements, in order to accommodate diverse social preferences
that were themselves still very much in transition in the early 1970s.
92
These examples point to a problem in thinking about the
Constitution as primarily serving a coordinating function, and in the
type of private law illustrations that drive Alexander and Schauer's
analysis. We must ask who and what exactly is being coordinated by
the Constitution. Constitutions are primarily directed at government
officials and regulate political behavior, unlike most laws that are
directed at private citizens and private behavior. It is of course
important that citizens know when elections will be held and where to
cast their ballots, as Alexander and Schauer indicate. But the
Constitution does not even attempt to coordinate that activity. State
and federal legislatures provide the specific rules around which
individuals can organize. More specific laws, and not just judicial
interpretations, routinely supplement constitutional silence or
vagueness. This is equally true in the context of free speech, which
forms Alexander and Schauer's other example. The alternative to
judicial clarification of the First Amendment is not interpretive
anarchy, but legislation. Legislatures have always had primary
responsibility for specifying the regulatory environment within which
private individuals engage in speech activities.93 Although such
91. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
92. Although the Court may have reasonably doubted the viability of any national
standards for obscenity, it has invited new difficulties by allowing federal "forum
shopping" for obscenity prosecutions. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701,
709-10 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Blucher, 581 F.2d 244,244-45 (10th Cir. 1978).
93. As the continuing controversy over the Miller case indicates, however, there may
be a multitude of local rule generating bodies. Uncertainty about constitutional meaning
may be rectified by numerous conflicting local standards rather than a single national
standard. One may then argue that greater social coordination can be achieved with a
single uniform standard articulated by some national institution (not necessarily the
Court). But Alexander and Schauer do not make that argument. Moreover, the
nationalization argument quickly encounters difficulties. Favoring national uniformity
over diversity is a substantively controversial decision that is even more difficult to
reconcile with Alexander and Schauer's desire for content-independent justifications for
judicial supremacy, for example. In the context of obscenity regulation, it reflects a desire
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statutory efforts may be excessively vague and require judicial
correction,94 that is hardly the important example of conflicts between
judicial and nonjudicial interpretive authority. More telling are the
cases in which the judiciary destabilizes a fairly clear speech regime
that had been established by legislatures, substituting its judgments of
what the First Amendment requires for legislative judgment. Either
the legislative or the judicial regime could serve the coordination
function, or indeed some equilibrium regime reflecting the
contributions of multiple institutions and interpreters. What is at
stake in such disputes is the substantive content of the constitutional
order. Alexander and Schauer beg the central question by insisting
that the sequence of constitutional interpretation stops with the
exercise of judicial review, rather than earlier with the passage of the
original legislation or later with the passage of revised legislation.
If the issue is not whether to settle the law but how to settle it,
then the institutional question of who should settle constitutional
disputes becomes more complicated. Courts and legislatures may
well settle such disputes differently in keeping with their own
particular institutional capacities. For example, individuals need
guidance as to what religious practices, what police interrogation
techniques, and what criminal prosecutions are legally permissible.
The Constitution provides some guidance on these questions, but it is
clear that individual interpreters are likely to differ as to what the
Constitution requires in each of these areas.9' It should be noted,
for a substantively more liberal regime than the "lowest common denominator." See, e.g.,
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 144 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Erik G.
Swenson, Comment, Redefining Community Standards in Light of the Geographic
Limitlessness of the Internet: A Critique of United States v. Thomas, 82 MINN. L. REv.
855, 878-80 (1998). In the context of economic regulations, it has historically reflected the
substantive interests of large corporations over local businesses and political preferences.
See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing Structural
Foundations of Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483,493-500 (1998). In the context
of purely local activities like voting, multiple local settlements can be just as effective in
coordinating individual behavior as a single national settlement. In the context of other
activities, multiple local settlements may discourage some forms of coordination while
simultaneously encouraging others.
94. The void-for-vagueness doctrine provides the primary support for Alexander and
Schauer's argument about free speech rules. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 31, at 1373
n.58.
95. Despite the indeterminacy of the constitutional text, political and legal actors may
still be able to coordinate around a determinate interpretation of the text. Particularly
prominent or culturally resonant glosses on constitutional principles and rules may
become "focal points" to which independent individual interpreters are naturally drawn.
The practical utility of such natural coordination mechanisms gains nothing from the
added injunction that they be accepted as "authoritative" or "supreme." In fact,
identifying an authoritative interpreter may even be destabilizing because its
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however, that individuals would not rely on their own personal
constitutional interpretations. Rather, guidance from the legislature,
which will specify what religious and police practices are legal, would
facilitate individual understanding. If the legislative answer is
problematic, it is probably not because it fails to satisfy the settlement
function of law. Laying that issue aside, the Court has adopted rules
regarding religious free exercise and police interrogations that
emphasize uniformity, bright lines, and lack of judicial discretion in
enforcing constitutional values. In Employment Division v. Smith, the
Court denied that "the appropriate occasions for [religious-practice
exemptions] creation can be discerned by the courts," since to do so
would require "judges to weight the social importance of all laws
against the centrality of all religious beliefs." 96  In Miranda v.
Arizona, the Court searched for a clear rule that could at least create
the presumption that custodial police confessions were voluntary and
non-coerced, while emphasizing that "we cannot say that the
Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular
solution." 97  In both instances the Court developed a particular
constitutional rule with its own institutional responsibilities in mind,
so as to maximize the efficiency of its direction and monitoring of the
lower courts and to minimize the tensions inherent in ad hoc judicial
balancing of conflicting social interests. 8 It is not unreasonable for a
legislature or executive officer to evaluate those concerns differently
interpretations may be in conflict with "more natural" interpretations to which many
actors are likely to continue to gravitate. See also Harrison, supra note 49, at 7-9 (noting
that an authoritative interpreter advocating a new or different rule may find itself out of
sync from the majority, and achieving better coordination by following a rule other than
one everyone else is following would be difficult). In the specific context of free speech,
for example, there was for much of the nation's history a discrepancy between a more
protective "popular tradition" and the legal rule enforced by the courts. MICHAEL KENT
CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE" 7-14 (2000). On focal
points more generally, see THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 53-74
(1960).
96. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); see also Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional
Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 59 (1993) ("A significant portion of the Court's justification
focuses on the difficulties that courts encounter in balancing interests in the fashion
required by the pre-Smith law."); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:
A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 190 (1997) ("The real logic
of the Smith decision has to do with institutional roles.").
97. 384 U.S. 436,467 (1966).
98. See TUSHNET, supra note 17, at 43 ("[J]udges stand in a supervisory relation to
other actors .... [J]udges have to articulate rules, standards, or guidelines that will lead
those other actors to comply to the greatest degree achievable with the Constitution as
understood by judges.").
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and choose a more flexible standard that vests more discretion in the
judiciary or elsewhere.99
Alexander and Schauer's emphasis on the settlement function of
law suggests that constitutional drafting and interpretation should
provide clear rules with broad scope, so as to "settle" as many social
questions at once as possible and avoid additional wasteful and
confusing debate over constitutional issues. As previously illustrated,
neither the founders nor subsequent political actors have always
adopted this strategy. For instance, Cass Sunstein has emphasized,
constitutional decisionmakers have sometimes been "minimalist"
rather than "maximalist."'0 Minimalism may be particularly justified
when "a constitutional issue is of high complexity about which many
people feel deeply and on which the nation is divided."'10 1 Alexander
and Schauer suggest that we should be willing to sacrifice
constitutional perfection for constitutional stability, but not all
constitutional issues are the same."° We tolerate the "imperfection"
of the constitutional rule against Presidents under the age of thirty-
five, but there may be less reason to tolerate the detailed trimester
scheme set forth by the Court in Roe v. Wade or the extreme
absolutism of the Court's opinion in Dred Scott. 03 More incremental
and ambiguous decisions leaving room for further political
negotiation may have been more appropriate in such cases. A
maximalist interpretation of the Constitution in the context of high
complexity and disagreement is more likely to be substantively
problematic and less likely to be able to command acquiescence. The
Court is unlikely to settle such issues, and to the extent that it does it
is likely to do so badly. Appeals to the settlement function of the law
do not have equal weight in all types of constitutional disputes.
99. In Dickerson v. United States, Justice Scalia argues that Congress can choose to
replace Miranda, which he characterizes as a mere "prophylactic rule," and contends that
Miranda has been of dubious value as a workable bright line. 530 U.S. 428, 444, 450-54,
463-64 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 3-23 (1999).
101. Id. at 5 (emphasis omitted); see also Michael C. Dorf, The Limits of Socratic
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60-79 (1998) (advocating a system of "provisional
adjudication").
102. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 31, at 1379-81.
103. Id. at 1379; see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973); Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 445-52 (1856). But see Alexander & Schauer, supra note 31, at
1383 ("[I]t is better to treat Dred Scott as aberrational .... "); Emily Sherwin, Ducking
Dred Scott: A Response to Alexander and Schauer, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 65, 65 (1998)
("Alexander and Schauer have not gone far enough.").
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The Constitution is not simply a mechanism for addressing
coordination problems. It is also about substantive values-
expressing them, securing them, and encouraging deliberation on
them. Even the settlement function is itself a contested constitutional
value. Advocates of judicial supremacy have long prized finality in
constitutionalism, and criticized those who would want to reopen old
controversies or start new ones.1°4 By contrast, those who have
favored extrajudicial interpretation have also tended to value public
deliberation and accountability and viewed the relative interpretive
openness of the Constitution as a positive good rather than an
unnecessary evil. 05 Many particular constitutional disputes are likely
to require balancing substantive and non-substantive values, rather
than simply maximizing content-independent values such as
facilitating, planning, and coordination. To the extent that
constitutionalism is concerned with more than the settlement
function, the justification for any form of interpretive supremacy is
weakened. Moreover, once we recognize that constitutionalism is
concerned With balancing multiple values rather than maximizing
one, then it becomes less clear that the judiciary is the best institution
for doing that balancing and rendering authoritative constitutional
interpretations. Even if the settlement function suggested the need
for lodging interpretive supremacy somewhere, it does not provide an
adequate justification for judicial supremacy.106
B. The Limits of Judicial Settlement
The capacity of the judiciary to settle constitutional disputes
easily can be overstated. The judiciary does, of course, resolve
individual cases, but that limited settlement function of the courts is
not in dispute. Few question the narrow Cooper claim that judicial
orders should be obeyed and enforced, at least in most circumstances.
104. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 28-32, 50-54,
83-84 (1999) (discussing Federalist and Whig appeals for legalistic constitutional finality).
105. See, e.g., BURT, supra note 17, at 98 ("[fln any regime committed to this
understanding of the equality principle, there can be no proper role for an authoritative
resolution of disputes."); WAYNE D. MOORE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 4 (1996) ("America's fundamental law depends on large
measures of openness and tentativeness rather than closure or rigidity."); SUNSTEIN, supra
note 100, at xiv; WHITTINGTON, supra note 104, at 1-9,54-56,77-82,207-08.
106. Substantive constitutional concerns with accountability and dispersion of political
power may argue against lodging interpretive supremacy with any single institution. See
Harrison, supra note 49, at 6 ("Cooper extends judicial finality from concrete disputes to
abstract propositions of law and hence adds substantially to the judges' power. By doing
so it calls into operation the master principle of American constitutional design: power is
dangerous.").
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The question is how effectively the courts can broadly settle contested
matters of constitutional interpretation. Critics of extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation assert and assume that the Court can do
so,1°7 but there are reasons to doubt their assumption in this regard.
The value of rules as such is that they allow individuals to plan
better, by knowing the consequences of their own activities and by
being able to predict the actions of others. Judicial supremacy is
thought to allow the courts to authoritatively settle disputes and
thereby allow individuals to get on with the business of planning their
lives rather than debating about or worrying over the content of the
rules. Judicial supremacy is not adequate to suppress agitation over
constitutional disputes, however. Agitation over constitutional
meaning may continue even in the presence of a clear law, for
example. Thus, a clear rule may allow individuals to know what the
law is today, but still not allow them to adequately predict what the
law will be in the future. Even if there is only one decisionmaker, and
perhaps especially when there is only one authoritative
decisionmaker, in the context of an ongoing controversy an individual
must account for uncertainty about the durability of any particular
rule and the applicability of similar principles to other situations.
A number of sociolegal scholars have emphasized the extent to
which the courts shape, rather than resolve disputes, for example, by
altering the strategic opportunities perceived by social and political
actors. This more "constitutive" than "regulative" view of law and
the courts suggests that we are easily misled by focusing on a single,
"authoritative" judicial decision rather than on the ongoing dispute
that predates that decision and continues after it. As Michael
McCann summarizes, "court actions often play an important, if
limited and partial, role in fashioning the different 'opportunity
structures' and discursive frameworks within which citizens act."10
Court decisions "work through the transmission and reception of
information rather than by concrete imposition of controls."10 9 The
"effects of judicial opinions ... are inherently indeterminate, variable,
dynamic, and interactive. 'The messages disseminated by courts do
107. See, e.g., Alexander & Schauer, supra note 31, at 1371 (arguing that judicial
supremacy is essential to the settlement function of the law).
108. Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 715,
733 (1992); see also MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM
AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 1-14, 278-310 (1994) (providing an
overview of the relationships between law and politics in pay equity disputes).
109. Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOuT
COURTS 117,126 (Keith 0. Boyum & Lynn Mather eds., 1983).
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not.., produce effects except as they are received, interpreted, and
used by [potential] actors.' "110 Likewise, "judicial opinions can
reshape the strategic landscape in ways that encourage other citizens
and officials to circumvent, defy, and even initiate counter-reform
efforts to alter court rulings."'1 From this perspective, neither the
law nor the courts can settle disputes in the sense that this objection
to extrajudicial constitutional interpretation requires. 2 In McCann's
own research on comparable worth litigation, for example, the
judiciary was simply one site of conflict among many between labor
unions and employers, and judicial decisions were a resource for
educating observers, organizing and mobilizing supporters, and
providing strategic leverage in negotiations with antagonists. The
courts could not and did not, however, settle the issues of comparable
worth and pay equity, let alone the broader labor disputes in which
those issues were embedded."'
The failure of any strong form of the judiciary's settlement
function is not simply the result of the inadequate acceptance of
judicial supremacy. Merely accepting the non-exclusivity of judicial
constitutional interpretation raises the possibility of legal and
interpretive instability. Relatively rarely are we likely to react to
judicial opinions as Anthony Lewis apparently has: "But when the
Court spoke, that was it. The decision reordered nearly everyone's
thinking.""n 4 Judicial decisions and opinions may have an effect on
how nonjudicial actors conceptualize particular constitutional
problems, but it is exceedingly rare that a judicial opinion can identify
a settlement that can extinguish a serious constitutional
controversy." 5 As two public opinion scholars concluded, "[w]hen
110. McCann, supra note 108, at 733 (alteration in original) (quoting Marc Galanter).
111. Id
112. See Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QUINNIPIAc L. REv.
339, 341-49 (1996).
113. MCCANN, supra note 108, at 278-310 (providing an overview of the relationships
between law and politics in the pay equity disputes).
114. Anthony Lewis, When the Court Speaks, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1997, at A29.
Ironically, Lewis was responding to the decision in Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997),
which in hindsight he found rather less appealing. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Paula Jones:
Lessons, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1998, at A23 (stating that the Court's decision was "divorced
from reality"); Anthony Lewis, Some Unfinished Business, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1999, at
A19 ("[W]e must correct the folly of the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in the Paula Jones
case."); Anthony Lewis, What Has Gone Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1998, at A17 ("Time
has made clear how wrong the Court was .... [T]his country is going to have to rescue the
Presidency from that legal swamp.").
115. See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 145-
56 (1989) (finding "little evidence that Court rulings influence mass public opinion");
Valerie J. Hoekstra & Jeffrey A. Segal, The Shepherding of Local Public Opinion: The
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the Court rules on politically controversial cases, it may establish the
law of the land, but it does not put an end to debate. It neither
converts the opposition nor ends the controversy.""' 6
Direct challenges to judicial supremacy are rare. More common
are efforts to evade the logic of the Court's reasoning and to influence
subsequent judicial opinions. Far from saying the last word on the
subject, major judicial forays into new constitutional issues are
invitations for litigation to extend or pare back the Court's rulings.
Court opinions can unsettle as well as settle the legal and
constitutional environment. Despite the apparent finality of the
abortion rules set forth in Roe, for example, Congress, the executive,
the states, and the courts have ever since been involved in the
reconsideration of Roe and its possible implications."7 Although
some of these efforts were couched in terms of challenges to judicial
supremacy, many were not.18 As both sides in the abortion debate
well understood, Roe was the beginning not the end of the debate,
and the law of abortion could hardly be regarded as settled.
Politicians were forced to dedicate substantial resources to the
abortion debate, despite Roe's effort to settle the issue.1 9 For
individuals, planning remained difficult in spite of the Court's rulings,
especially given the substantial social resistance to abortion despite
Supreme Court and Lamb's Chapel, 58 J. POL. 1079, 1088-94 (1996) (finding Court
decisions affect opinion only among those with high awareness of the decision but weak
prior beliefs about the issue); see also Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican
Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 751, 768 (1989) (finding Court decisions reinforce existing cleavages in public
opinion).
116. Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 115, at 753.
117. See DEVINS, supra note 17, at 56-120. Alexander and Schauer have noted that
"our critics are unwilling to come out strongly in support of dispersal of interpretive
authority among the 50 states," but the claim depends on how "extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation" is understood. Few scholars are eager to authorize either the states or the
national government to be "free to take Supreme Court decisions as being limited to the
case in which they arose," but many may be willing to allow both state and national actors
to challenge judicial constitutional interpretations. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 76,
at 476.
118. The "Human Life Bill" can be regarded as a challenge to judicial supremacy, but
the legislatively and politically more important debates over public funding of abortions,
federal funding of fetal tissue research, parental and spousal notification, waiting periods,
partial birth abortions, and the like were not. On the Human Life Bill, see BURGESS,
supra note 17, at 30-49.
119. See DEVINS, supra note 17, at 79-82. Indeed, the issue may be more politically
settled since the Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 510 U.S. 1309 (1992), decision actually
made judicial doctrine less rigid and final, for the enhanced legislative responsibility for
abortion-law outcomes has altered the incentives facing politicians so as to encourage
compromise and stability rather than position-taking. See DEVINS, supra note 17, at 96.
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the putative legal settlement. Judicial intervention in the controversy
may have even helped radicalize abortion opponents, rendering the
social environment even less settled than it otherwise would have
been. 120 By detaching constitutional interpretation from the political
and social context, the judiciary may hamper rather than facilitate
productive social and political decisionmaking.'
The doctrine of stare decisis is also a thin reed upon which to
base arguments for judicial supremacy. Although providing formal
support for the notion that the Court provides more stable
constitutional settlements than other institutions, neither the theory
nor practice of stare decisis is completely reassuring in this context. It
is notable that this argument for judicial supremacy assumes a strong
theory of stare decisis that otherwise has little theoretical support in
the constitutional context.22  Although most interpretive
constitutional theories make some room for precedent, few regard
precedent as decisive by itself. 23 At best, precedent is one mode of
constitutional argument among many, and most modem interpretive
theories regard precedent as less determinative in the context of
constitutional interpretation than in the context of statutory
interpretation. 24 Stare decisis may add some stability to judicial
constitutional interpretation, but the appropriate place of precedent
in constitutional decisionmaking is far less resolved than proponents
of judicial supremacy suggest.
120. See Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 115, at 768.
121. See generally Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political
Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83 (1998) (emphasizing the need for interbranch dialogue).
122. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 23, 23-26 (1994); Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality,
Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE LJ. 2031, 2088 (1996).
123. See generally Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in
Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 401 (1988) (noting the tension between
stare decisis and interpretation of a written constitution); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of
Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68
(1991) (examining the balancing of precedent against other factors of constitutional
interpretation); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the
Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REv. 647 (1999) (examining changing
treatment of precedent over time); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723 (1988) (examining tension between
originalism and stare decisis). But see David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996) (grounding constitutional interpretation in
precedent); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE I.J. 221 (1973) (same).
124. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 39-58 (1982); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1189, 1204 n.66 (1987); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72
TEx. L. REv. 1753, 1758-67 (1994).
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The practice of stare decisis is also problematic for those who
would favor judicial over nonjudicial constitutional interpretation.125
Prior interpretive decisions can lend stability to constitutional
interpretation by being either regulative or constitutive of later
interpretations. In order to distinguish judicial from nonjudicial
institutions, however, the value of precedent must lie in its regulative
character-its doctrinal, formal authority. Unfortunately, precedent
is unlikely to be very regulative in a strong form. Although precedent
may help channel judicial decisionmaking as long as the Justices
regard the previous cases as largely correct, it is not clear that stare
decisis poses a strong obstacle to reversing course when Justices come
to believe that the precedent is wrong. The constitutive role of prior
decisions-their value as cognitive heuristics and ideological
constructs-is likely to be the more empirically plausible, but also is
not unique to the judiciary.26 Legislators and Presidents necessarily
view the Constitution through the lens of the past, even though they
do not subscribe to the binding authority of history. Extrajudicial
constitutional decisions are responsive to past decisions and
demonstrate stability, even though nonjudicial actors do not view
themselves as regulated by a doctrine of stare decisis. At the same
time, Justices routinely flaunt the regulative authority of precedent.
They challenge the authority of precedent as soon as it is written by
publishing dissents, and they often adhere to that dissenting position
in later cases.127 Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Stevens and White,
for example, expressed their dissent from the newly announced law in
the first flag burning case, and they adhered to their dissenting
125. It is noteworthy that Alexander and Schauer now criticize the Court for being
insufficiently concerned with its settlement function and argue that the Court should be
more concerned with stare decisis, issue fewer divided judgments, and the like. Alexander
& Schauer, supra note 76, at 479-80. Although this prescription follows naturally from
their larger theory, the descriptive admission raises problems for their institutional
analysis.
126. My claim is not that precedent never serves its regulative function, but merely that
the overall significance of the regulative function cannot be assumed. See generally Barry
Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33-57
(1998) (placing constitutional understandings in context of historical development);
Howard Gillman, What's Law Got To Do With It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the "Legal
Model" of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 465,485-96 (2001) (on law
as a "state of mind"); Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: Post-
Behavioralist Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 601, 622-28 (2000)
(discussing legal rules as cognitive heuristics).
127. See HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY
WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 287-301 (1999)
(finding that "the justices are rarely influenced by stare decisis").
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position when the Court revisited the issue the next year.128 Changes
in the membership of the Court augur changes in the case law, for the
Court is likely to abandon precedents that are no longer consistent
with the commitments of the new majority. 129
The existing law is vulnerable to pivotal changes in the
substantive goals of the lawmakers, whether those lawmakers sit on
the bench or in the capitol. 3 Even in the relatively legalistic domain
of state liability under federal statutes, the Court has performed
several flip-flops in a fairly short period of time and Justices have
bitterly questioned the stability of decisions. 3' Any relative
advantage in the stability of judicial decisionmaking is more likely to
be a function of the lifetime appointments of federal judges than
respect for the authority of precedent. A more direct focus on life
tenure as the basis of judicial stability would necessarily raise the
embarrassing normative issues of accountability and responsiveness
and the basic rationale for democratic lawmaking. Given the routine
turnover of judicial personnel, even this can only be regarded as a
moderate advantage. 32 The Court is not a monolith. It decides
constitutional issues by majority rule, and few can regard a
controversial question as finally settled when decisive majorities may
128. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,319 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397,421,436 (1989).
129. Christopher P. Banks, The Supreme Court and Precedent: An Analysis of Natural
Courts and Reversal Trends, 75 JUDICATURE 262, 263 (1992); see also SAUL BRENNER &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS 59-107 (1995) (presenting an empirical study of
precedent alteration from 1946 to 1992); Lawrence Baum, Membership Change and
Collective Voting Change in the United States Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 3, 10-13 (1992)
(finding that membership change was the main source of voting change in civil liberties
decisions between 1946 and 1985).
130. See KEITH KREHBIEL, PIvOTAL PoLrIcs: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 46
(1998) (discussing the correction of "out-of-equilibrium policies").
131. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that
"[t]he Court today takes the altogether different tack of arguing that state immunity from
suit in state court was an inherent right of states preserved by the Tenth Amendment");
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (calling
the majority opinion "a serious invasion of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth
Amendment that.., is ... not consistent with our constitutional federalism").
132. See Robert A. Dahl, Decisionmaking in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279,285 (1957) ("[O]n the average one new justice has
been appointed every twenty-two months .... [T]he policy views dominant on the Court
are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking
majorities of the United States."); James A. Stimson et al., Dynamic Representation, 89
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 543, 555 (1995) ("Court decisions do, in fact, vary in accord with
current public preferences... this dynamic representation is about a third to a quarter as
effective as for the House and Senate.").
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hinge on the vote of a single individual. The smaller the
decisionmaking body, the greater the probability that any individual
decisionmaker could be decisive to the outcome. To this degree,
judicial majorities are more fragile than legislative majorities.
C. The Possibilities of Extrajudicial Settlements
If critics of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation overstate
the stability of judicial interpretation, they also underestimate the
stability of nonjudicial interpretation. Judicial supremacy is not
necessary to settle constitutional understandings. Examples of
extrajudicial settlement of constitutional disputes are commonplace.
Britain has long relied on constitutional convention rather than
constitutional law to provide such settlements, and analogous
practices exist in the United States.a33 Policymakers were faced with
constitutional indeterminacies early on in the nation's history and had
little expectation that the judiciary either would or could clarify and
stabilize the constitutional rules. Elected officials reached
constitutional settlements of their own. Congress determined, for
example, that the President could unilaterally remove executive
officials."M The President successfully vetoed legislation on policy
grounds 35 and excluded the Senate from the negotiation of treaties.36
Congress and the President agreed on procedures for acquiring new
territory and admitting new states into the union. 37 The House and
Senate established an understanding of impeachable offenses, and
insisted that partisanship was inconsistent with judicial office.
138
George Washington set an enduring precedent of the two-term
presidency, and Abraham Lincoln marshaled support for the view
that states did not have a right to secede from the Union. The Senate
understands that Presidents will generally nominate only members of
133. See HERBERT W. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
passim (1925) (comparing the American and English constitutions); GEOFFREY
MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS passim (1984). See generally James G.
Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially Unenforceable Rules that
Combine with Judicial Doctrine and Public Opinion to Regulate Political Behavior, 40
BUFF. L. REV. 645 (1992) (listing, inter alia, the presidential electoral college, treaty
interpretation, and Senate approval of Supreme Court nominees as examples of
"constitutional conventions").
134. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 8, at 37-41.
135. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO 29 (1988).
136. See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 222 (1994)
(chronicling a violent outburst from Washington in frustration with Senate discord).
137. See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 70-
73 (1976).
138. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 104, at 25-50.
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their own party to serve in government offices, while the President
understands the requirements of "senatorial courtesy." These
settlements and others have endured through most of the nation's
history with little assistance from the judiciary.
Other political interpretations of the Constitution have
structured government behavior for decades at a time. The
Federalists established a broad interpretation of federal powers that
embraced the incorporation of a national bank, and the Jacksonian
Democrats replaced it with a narrow interpretation-John Marshall's
formal endorsement of the broad interpretation notwithstanding.
139
The Federalists successfully claimed that the federal tariff power
could be used to protect domestic manufacturers, and the Jacksonian
Democrats forcefully abandoned that claim."4  Presidents through
most of American history claimed a power to impound appropriated
funds, and in the 1970s Congress successfully established a framework
for regulating the presidential spending power and clarifying the
congressional power of the purse. 4' Congress regularly passes
"framework legislation" and "statutes revolving in constitutional law
orbits."142 For much of the nineteenth century, legislatures were the
primary institution for determining the scope of individual rights and
were able to settle such disputes at least as effectively as the
judiciary.4
3
Extrajudicial constitutional settlements gain their stability from a
variety of sources, despite the absence of a formal commitment to the
authority of precedent. Not least among these supports for
settlement is popular opinion. As Edward Corwin noted in outlining
departmentalist theory, "finality of interpretation is hence the
outcome-when indeed it exists-not of judicial application of the
Constitution... but of a continued harmony of views among the three
139. See Mark A. Graber, The Jacksonian Origins of Chase Court Activism, 25 J. Sup.
CT. HIST. 17, 26-28 (2000); Whittington, supra note 63, at 368-77.
140. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 104, at 93-106.
141. Id. at 162-73.
142. See generally Gerhard Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of
Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 463, 482 (1976)
(noting that "framework" legislation interprets the Constitution by providing a legal
framework for the governmental decisionmaking process); Gerhard Casper, The
Constitutional Organization of the Government, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177, 187-93
(1985) ("Both declaratory and regulatory in nature, framework legislation describes the
constitutional allocation of authority and regulates the decisionmaking of the President
and the Congress.") [hereinafter Casper, Constitutional Organization]; Lupu, supra note
96, at 3-6 (analyzing a specialized subset of statutes that utilize the language of the
Constitution itself).
143. See JOHN J. DINAN, KEEPING THE PEOPLE'S LIBERTIES 10-59 (1998).
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departments. It rests, in other words, in the last analysis, on the voting
power of public opinion."1" James Madison reached a similar
conclusion in defending extrajudicial constitutional settlements in the
First Congress, contending that:
In all systems there are points which must be adjusted by the
departments themselves, to which no one of them is
competent. If it cannot be determined in this way, there is
no resource left but the will of the community, to be
collected in some mode to be provided by the [C]onstitution,
or one dictated by the necessity of the case.145
The few historical instances in which Presidents have challenged
judicial supremacy and asserted departmentalist theories of
constitutional interpretation, they have also commanded precisely
this type of public support. Departmentalist Presidents such as
Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt rejected the
finality of judicial interpretations in the name of broadly supported
popular interpretations. 46 As reconstructive leaders, each of these
Presidents was able to forge a new but stable political consensus
around his preferred constitutional understandings. 147
Nonjudicial political actors value legal settlement and stability as
well, and as a consequence they generally strive to produce it.
14 8
Political actors look for compromises and points of agreement so as
144. CORWIN, supra note 42, at 7.
145. JAMES MADISON, 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 238 (Charles F. Hobson &
Robert Rutland eds., 1977); see also JAMES MADISON, 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 372 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (observing that "a course of practice of sufficient
uniformity and duration to carry with it the public sanction shall settle doubtful or
contested meanings"). Judicial decisions, under this view, could be important as evidence
of that "course of practice," though not as authoritative interpretations. See Harrison,
supra note 49, at 19.
146. Keith E. Whittington, Presidential Challenges to Judicial Supremacy and the
Politics of Constitutional Meaning, 33 POLITY 365 (2001); see also JOHN AGRESTO, THE
SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 77-95 (1984); BURGESS, supra
note 17, at 3-7; FISHER, supra note 17, at 238-47; ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 23-60 (1971).
147. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE 38-39 (1993) ("By
shattering the politics of the past, orchestrating the establishment of a new coalition, and
enshrining their commitments as the restoration of original values, [these reconstructive
Presidents] have reset the very terms and conditions of constitutional government.").
148. This is not universally true, however. Notably, marginalized political actors have
an interest in destabilizing existing settlements and fanning controversy. For example, the
second party system dominated by the Democrats and the Whigs was dedicated to
preserving as much as possible early settlements of the slavery issue. By contrast, the
success of the Republican Party was dependent on the collapse of that settlement and the
intensification of the slavery controversy. Politics is relatively open to such efforts, and
such cases again raise the question of whether stability should be regarded as a content-
independent good.
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to bring lingering conflicts to a close. A concern with opportunity
costs, a positive desire to maintain stability, and sheer inertia
discourage nonjudicial officials from disrupting existing constitutional
arrangements without good reason, and indeed elected officials often
recognize the weight of prior practice in their deliberations. 149 The
constitutional structure itself tends to generate stability and
moderation by requiring large coalitions to support change.150
Although there have been periodic upheavals, political coalitions and
the core political agenda are generally quite stable.'' In general,
elected officials operate within the ideological and institutional
framework established in earlier political debates. Extrajudicial
constitutional settlements are reinforced through the construction of
viable and durable electoral and legislative coalitions, the alteration
and mobilization of public opinion, and the structuring of political
institutions. 2  By ensuring that no one has both the incentive and
power to destabilize a given extrajudicial settlement, political actors
render their constitutional interpretations "self-enforcing. '
Regardless of judicial constitutional precedent, the workings of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, among other institutional and sociological
factors, ensure that no credible politician has any desire to try to
149. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 104, at 175-83 (discussing the use of historical
practice in war power debates).
150. See, e.g., Thomas H. Hammond & Gary J. Miller, The Core of the Constitution, 81
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1155,1157-63 (1987) (providing a formal analysis of stabilizing effects
of constitutional structure); KREHBIEL, supra note 130, at 230-31 (providing a formal and
empirical analysis of stabilizing effects of constitutional structure).
151. KREHBIEL, supra note 130, at 4-6, 84-85; KEiTH T. POOLE & HOWARD
ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS 58,67-69 (1997).
152. WHrIINGTON, supra note 104, at 207-28.
153. See generally TUSHNET, supra note 17, at 95-128 (using the "incentive-
compatible" economic model); Avner Greif, On the Political Foundations of the Late
Medieval Commercial Revolution: Genoa During the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, 54
J. ECON. HIsT. 271 (1994) (analyzing self-enforcement in political systems and economic
growth); Douglas C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J.
ECON. HIST. 803 (1989) (studying constitutional evolution and capital market growth);
Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, 36
INT'L ORG. 299 (1982) (creating interest-based models by which international regimes
develop); L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980)
(examining self-enforcement mechanisms for co-venturers seeking agreement); Barry R.
Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 245 (1997) ("[D]emocratic stability depends on a self-enforcing equilibrium: It must
be in the interests of political officials to respect democracy's limits on their behavior.");
Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73
AM. ECON. REv. 519 (1983) (examining transactional costs for self-enforcement); H.
Peyton Young, The Economics of Conventions, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 105 (1996) (modeling
the formation of conventions with a game theory approach).
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recreate Jim Crow, for example."' Similarly, despite internal
disagreement and the lack of external enforcement mechanisms, the
legislative chambers have readily managed to create stable
subconstitutional rules of internal governance to facilitate
coordination.55 Political actors have their own motives and means
for reducing instability and uncertainty in the constitutional and legal
environment.
In sum, this objection to extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation assumes that finality is the primary constitutional value
and one that only the judiciary can produce. Neither assumption is
warranted. Finality is a contested virtue in the constitutional context,
and one that must be balanced with other concerns. Constitutions do
not always or only serve these sorts of coordination and efficiency
functions. Judicial supremacy is not the only mechanism for
achieving the benefits of settled law in facilitating productive social
action. Judicial constitutional interpretation can be destabilizing as
well as stabilizing, and formal judicial supremacy divorced from the
wider political and social environment is unlikely to settle effectively
constitutional disputes. Extrajudicial constitutional interpretation
often does produce stable constitutional settlements, even without the
recognized existence of an "ultimate" interpreter or adherence to a
formal doctrine of stare decisis. There must be some finality to the
resolution of constitutional and legal disputes for society to function
productively, but constitutional equilibria can be achieved in myriad
ways and the stability of the constitutional environment is best
regarded as a continuous rather than a dichotomous variable. The
alternative to a judicially imposed constitutional order is not anarchy.
III. SECOND OBJECTION: IT'S IRRATIONAL
The appeal to the settlement function of law is also an appeal to
a substantively minimal, or "content independent," justification for
154. See, e.g., EARL BLACK, SOUTHERN GOVERNORS AND CIVIL RIGHTS passim
(1976) (examining declining influence of segregationist politicians in 1960s). It should be
emphasized that more basic sociological factors undermined legislative resistance to
desegregation independently of the mobilization of black voters. See, e.g., Joe R. Feagan,
Civil Rights Voting by Southern Congressmen, 34 J. POL. 484,485 (1972).
155. See STANLEY BACH & STEVEN S. SMITH, MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 38-111 (1988) (examining rules governing floor votes);
GARY W. Cox & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN passim (1993)
(proposing legislative parties as a solution to the collective action problem); Barry R.
Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why
Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 143-55
(1988) (analyzing efficiencies of legislative structures).
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judicial supremacy.'56 Any interpretation of the Constitution would
be acceptable, as long as it is stable. By contrast, the second common
objection to extrajudicial constitutional interpretation is distinctly
substantive. The value of judicial supremacy, in this argument, is not
in its capacity to provide authoritative legal settlements, but in its
capacity to provide substantively desirable legal outcomes. The
judiciary alone serves as a "forum of principle" within the American
constitutional system, and deference to extrajudicial decisionmaking
would sacrifice the rule of reason to the rule of will.
157
This argument also has deep roots in American history. John
Marshall defended the Court from attack in part by drawing a sharp
distinction between matters of law and matters of politics. 158 There
could be all kinds of reasonable disagreements about matters of
politics, and those disagreements may best be settled in the legislative
arena. About the law, however, there could be only one right answer,
and by skill and temperament judges were most likely to come to that
answer. Freed from the political pressures that gave elected officials
a stake in the outcome of constitutional disputes, judges need merely
open their eyes to the Constitution to see the truth. Although
Marshall emphasized the uncontroversial nature of the judiciary
identifying obvious constitutional violations, 159 his distinction between
law and politics benefited from the belief in the esoteric nature of
legal reasoning that privileged the scholarly credentials of a judge
over the representative credentials of a legislator. The great British
jurist Edward Coke, who anticipated the power of judicial review, is
156. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 31, at 1371; see also id. at 1361 ("An important
aspect of the Constitution, as of all law, is its authority, and intrinsic to the concept of
authority is that it provides content-independent reasons for action. Accordingly, an
authoritative constitution has normative force even for an agent who believes its directives
to be mistaken.").
157. DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 33-34.
158. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("The province of the
court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals .... Questions, in their nature
political ... can never be made in this court."); see also SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 109-75 (1990) (chronicling the Marshall
phase of constitutional jurisprudential evolution); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL
COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 53-61, 196-200 (1991) (analyzing
republican theories of politics); George L. Haskins, Law Versus Politics in the Early Years
of the Marshall Court, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1981) (noting Marshall's intent to separate
law from politics); William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John
Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 932-56 (1978) (calling the
distinction "centrally important to understanding John Marshall's jurisprudence"). But cf.
Christopher L. Eisgruber, John Marshall's Judicial Rhetoric, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 439, 440-
41 (arguing that Marshall wanted "to convince people that national institutions, including
the federal judiciary, would govern well").
159. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-80.
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reputed to have relied on such claims in order to assert authority over
the British king. To Coke's declaration that the king could not judge
cases:
The King said, that he thought the Law was founded upon
Reason, and that he and others had Reason, as well as the
Judges: To which it was answered by me, that true it was,
that god had endowed his Majesty with excellent Science,
and great Endowments of Nature, but his Majesty was not
learned in the Laws of his Realm of England .... [Cases]
are not be decided by natural Reason, but by the artificial
Reason and Judgment of Law, which Law is an Act which
requires long Study and Experience, before that a Man can
attain to the Cognizance of it.16°
Alexander Hamilton echoed Coke's claim in arguing that the
long judicial tenure under the proposed Constitution was in keeping
with the high qualifications that the judicial office would require. The
complexities and bulk of the law "must demand long and laborious
study to acquire a competent knowledge of them." 61
The authority of judicial supremacy is rooted on the sharp
distinction between the considerations of expediency that are thought
to dominate the legislature and the considerations of principle that
are thought to dominate the judiciary. The faith that the law was
found rather than made by judges was shattered by Legal Realism in
the twentieth century, if not earlier, but the faith in the principled
nature of judicial decisionmaking has survived.62 As Edward Corwin
argued early in this century, "law comes to be looked upon more and
more as something made rather than as something discovered ,-as an
act of authority rather than an act of knowledge."' 63 This insight
would seem to undermine judicial authority relative to that of
legislators, but Corwin assures us that:
The concept of an automatic declaration of the law is... no
longer necessary to the doctrine of the separation of powers.
The judges change the law, it is true, but they go about the
business in a vastly different way than the legislature does.
The legislature acts simply upon considerations of
expediency. The judges are controlled by precedent, logic,
160. Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Co. Rep. 65 (1607).
161. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiser ed.,
1961). Hamilton is thinking specifically of statutory law here.
162. Legal Realism emphasized the indeterminacy of legal rules and the importance of
individual judges in creating legal outcomes. For one historical overview, see LAURA
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986).
163. EDWARD S. COR WIN, THE DocrRiNE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 64(1914).
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the sensible meaning of words, and their perception of moral
consequences. 164
This theme was picked up and elaborated in the postwar period by
Legal Process theorists such as Herbert Wechsler, 65 Henry Hart,"6
Harry Wellington,167 and Alexander Bickel. 6'
Perhaps the most prominent contemporary defender of this view
is Ronald Dworkin. To Dworkin, political institutions are inadequate
to addressing matters of moral principle. Instead of "reasoned
debate":
[The] process is dominated by political alliances that are
formed around a single issue and use the familiar tactics of
pressure groups to bribe or blackmail legislators into voting
as they wish. The great moral debate that [Judge Learned]
Hand thought essential to the spirit of liberty never begins.
Ordinary politics generally aims, moreover, at a political
compromise that gives all powerful groups enough of what
they want to prevent their disaffection, and reasoned
argument elaborating underlying moral principles is rarely
part or even congenial to such compromises. 6 9
Fortunately, the Court offers an alternative:
We have an institution that calls some issues from the
battleground of power politics to the forum of principle. It
holds out the promise that the deepest, most fundamental
conflicts between individual and society will once,
164. Id. (citation omitted).
165. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959) ("[The courts] are bound to function otherwise than as a
naked power organ; they participate as courts of law ... in that they are-or are obliged to
be-entirely principled.").
166. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84,
99 (1959) ("Only opinions which are grounded in reason.., can do the job which the
Supreme Court of the United States has to do.").
167. See, e.g., Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE LJ. 221, 246-47 (1973) (A legislature
"would be constructed with the understanding that it was to respond to the people's
exercise of political power." The judiciary should "be insulated from such pressure. It
would provide an environment conducive to rumination, reflection, and analysis. 'Reason,
not power' would be the motto over its door.").
168. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 58 (1962)
(Judicial review "is justified only if it injects into representative government something
that is not already there; and that is principle, standards of action that derive their worth
from a long view of society's spiritual as well as material needs that command adherence
whether or not the immediate outcome is expedient or agreeable.").
169. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 34, at 344-45.
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someplace, finally, become questions of justice. I do not call
that religion or prophecy. I call it law. 70
According to this view, the alternative to judicial supremacy is
apparently the abandonment of constitutional principles.
171
A. The Limits of Judicial Reason
Framed in this fashion, this objection to extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation pulls in conflicting directions. The
tensions are not resolved, however, by disentangling the threads of
the objection. Whereas Alexander Hamilton defended the judiciary
in terms of the artificial reason of the law, Ronald Dworkin defends
the courts in terms of the "regulatory reason" of liberal moral
philosophy.172 We have moved from a belief in the science of law to a
wish for a principled discourse. 73 Dworkin is clear in arguing that
constitutional interpretation requires engagement with "fundamental
questions of political morality and philosophy," not "technical
exercises in an arcane and conceptual craft."' 74 But the Dworkinian
shift creates a complication and not just a transition in the defense of
the courts as uniquely reasonable. Although Dworkin may prefer
that the Court pay more attention to the "philosopher's brief' 7" than
to either the "Brandeis brief"'76 or the lawyer's brief, neither the
170. DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 71.
171. See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 89 (1987)
("Judiciary is unique in that it is the only institution committed to arriving at decisions
based entirely on arguments and reasoning."); Frank I. Michelman, Judicial Supremacy,
the Concept of Law, and the Sanctity of Life, in JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 140, 145 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996) ("[W]e do best
to assume strong advantages.., from well-honed dialectical and judgmental capabilities;
from a cultivated sense of the distinction between public and personal reason; and from a
live and broad working knowledge of the law, along with a studied grasp of the country's
deep political-moral culture.") (footnote omitted); Alexander & Schauer, supra note 31, at
1367 ("[T]here is no reason to suppose that legislators, executives, or bureaucrats would
be especially adept at constitutional interpretation.., and good reason to suppose that
they would be particularly ill-suited to interpret constitutional provisions designed to limit
their own powers.").
172. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 249-51 (1978); STEVEN D.
SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON 73-104 (1998) (analyzing the
shift from traditional legalistic reasoning to philosophical "regulatory reason" in
constitutional theory).
173. SMITH, supra note 172, at 73-104.
174. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 34, at 331,343.
175. Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers' Brief, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Mar. 27, 1997, at 41.
176. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (concerning Brandeis's brief that primarily
presented descriptive facts on social conditions in support of the constitutionality of
female maximum-hours law).
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judiciary nor constitutional theory has proven willing to fully embrace
moral theorizing as the Court's central institutional mission. In
recognition of this institutional fact, Dworkin himself imposes a
constraint of "fit" on moral reasoning in the context of constitutional
interpretation. The "arduous virtue of fidelity" requires that judges
temper their moral reasoning with a concern for inherited text,
historical practice, and judicial precedent.1
7
Although we might be willing to recognize and defer to the
technical expertise of the courts in rendering legal judgments, the
special competence of the courts to provide principled deliberation
on constitutional values is substantially less clear. Judicial discourse
is characterized by an uneasy mix of different modes of analysis and
argumentation that fit awkwardly with the forum-of-principle
imagery. Arguments based on text, authorial intent, historical
practice, constitutional structure, and precedent are as acceptable and
at least as expected in the courts as arguments based on principled
reason and the national ethos.178 In practice, the Justices spend far
more time analyzing and employing the Court's own precedents than
in constructing a coherent, let alone compelling, vision of justice. 79
The argumentative variety on the bench reflects both the inherent
pluralism of the legal tradition and the underlying contradictions of
normative constitutional theory.180 Even as theorists hail the Court as
177. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and
Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1249, 1249-50 (1997) ("Lawyers and judges faced with a
contemporary constitutional issue must try to construct a coherent, principled, and
persuasive interpretation of the text of particular clauses, the structure of the Constitution
as a whole, and our history under the Constitution.").
178. See BOBBITT, supra note 124, at 3-119 (describing "a typology of constitutional
arguments"); Fallon, supra note 124, at 1194-1209; Griffin, supra note 124, at 1745-68.
Although such modes of argumentation may not encourage moral deliberation, they may
be useful in constraining judges to deciding cases based on reasoned argument rather than
mere favoritism or "will." Of course, many advocates of judicial reasoning, including
Dworkin, are skeptical of the restraining capacity of neutral reasoning. More relevant for
present purposes, however, is the importance of such a reason/will dichotomy for a
defense of judicial supremacy. Though neutral legal reasoning may be useful in
restraining judges from being willful in regard to the individual parties that come before
the bench, it means little for determining whether judges or legislators should specify the
constitutional principles to be applied in future cases.
179. Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive
Theory in the Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 567, 590-96 (1991). By contrast, the use of precedent can be regarded as
part of a method of philosophical reflective equilibrium, as a means of discussing moral
substance rather than avoiding it. Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 955-61 (1990).
180. See BOBBITT, supra note 124, at 3-119; LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V.
TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF 3-25 (1996); Griffin, supra note 124, at 1758-62.
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a potential voice of reason in the constitutional arena, they disagree
radically among themselves as to what sorts of arguments are in fact
reasonable and appropriate for the Court to adopt. Given these
apparently inescapable theoretical (and political) disagreements, the
Court's recent penchant for an incremental muddling through with
complex and divided opinions and relatively modest substantive
movement may itself seem prudent, an appropriate response to
persistent political divisions and an uncertain environment.181
Although such "chastened aspirations" may seem appropriate in the
contemporary context, it is hard to regard such judicial reasoning as
deserving special deference."
The particularly judicial function of the courts also prevents
them from consistently functioning as a special forum of principle.
This objection to extrajudicial constitutional interpretation
emphasizes the interpretive capacity of the courts and the reasoning
contained in judicial opinions. The production of constitutional
interpretations is a byproduct of the judicial function, however, and
not its primary task, which is deciding cases. 83 Moreover, the
primacy of the judicial task of resolving cases affects how the Court
approaches its interpretive role. Judicial opinions are structured by
their primary functions of legitimating decisions and guiding judges in
future cases. These concerns pull judicial opinions away from
principled deliberation on constitutional fundamentals and toward
the development and application of technical legal rules and narrow
arguments. Genuine principled deliberation requires an openness
that subverts the judicial task of dispute resolution. In order to
sustain their legitimacy as neutral arbitrators of disputes, judges oftenminimize the potentially controversial nature of their decisions.'14
Controversial judgments are presented as summary conclusions,
denying the relevance of reasoned political judgment to resolving the
issues presented in a given case. Rather than inviting dialogue on
181. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 100, at 5 (urging "minimalism" as a response
to uncertainty); Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text:
A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821 (1985) (urging
acceptance of a constitutional "imperfect muddle" given the theoretical incoherence of
constitutional "perfectionism"); Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling
Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 84-88 (1959) (describing incrementalism as a rational
response to uncertainty).
182. Mark Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional
Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29,69-96 (1999).
183. See Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 123, 126-36 (1999).
184. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES 16 (2000).
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political fundamentals, a court must endeavor to close off further
debate on the meaning of the law and turn away challenges to its
reasoning. The Court's particular concern with supervising lower
courts and its general concern with establishing precedent directs it
away from general ruminations on constitutional meaning. The early
nineteenth-century Court may have understood itself as a "republican
schoolmaster"1 5 seeking to persuade a broad audience on matters of
political principle; later Courts have been more fully integrated into
the legal machinery. 86 "Although American legal oratory once
displayed a literary elegance, it has become technical, spare, and
reductive."'" The Justices of the Supreme Court are not primarily
statesmen or philosophers, but lawyers.
The process of judicial decisionmaking also calls into question
the unique deliberative capacity of the courts."' The cases that reach
the Supreme Court are overwhelmingly hard cases in which the
correct answers, given the existing law, are at best unclear, if not
wholly indeterminate. Nonetheless, the Justices are remarkably
consistent, even predictable, in casting their votes in these cases.
They can be readily arrayed on a standard conservative-liberal
ideological spectrum either by scholars looking at their voting record
or by journalists covering their initial appointment, and those
identifications are adequate to predicting future voting behavior.18 9
185. Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SuP. Cr.
REV. 127, 129-55 (discussing the early Court as purveyor of constitutional knowledge); see
also Eisgruber, supra note 158, at 445-73 (examining Marshall's opinions as public texts).
186. See HQward Gillman, Regime Politics and Judicial Empowerment The Case of
Federal Courts in Late Nineteenth-Century America, AM. POL. S0. REV. (forthcoming
2002) (examining the integration of the federal judiciary into the administration of
national policy in the late nineteenth century).
187. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 961,1002 (1992); see also ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAv AND LETrERS IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 290 (1984) ("Legal knowledge in the twentieth century would reach
only the few; it would have less and less to do with America's general search for self-
expression.").
188. The usual restraints of the ideal judicial process may also be unable to restrain the
divisiveness of the politically charged hard cases that come before the Court. See generally
EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS (1998) (documenting a former clerk's account
of the internal politics of the Court); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN (1979) (providing a journalistic account of the internal politics of the Court).
189. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATrlTUDINAL MODEL 65, 221-31 (1993) ("Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he does
because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he is
extremely liberal."). This is not to say that Presidents always correctly forecast or exploit
the predictability of the Justices in making their appointments, though the evidence
suggests that more recent nominees have generally been quite accurately gauged at the
time of their appointments. Although Justice O'Connor may be the pivotal voter on the
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The political party affiliations of federal judges generally and of the
appointing Presidents are likewise strongly tied to the voting
decisions made by those judges.9 0 Such results do not indicate that
judges simply act on political preferences without regard to
jurisprudential considerations, nor do they establish that judges reach
the same conclusions to constitutional questions that legislators
would."' They do, however, call into question the assumption that
judges are uniquely principled or thoughtful in reaching their
decisions. The Justices approach controversial constitutional
questions with their own sets of prior commitments that are reliably
expressed in their voting.
Court as a relatively moderate conservative, her voting behavior is broadly predictable
over time. Id. at 253-54. Even the "stealth candidate," Justice David Souter, has voted in
a manner consistent with initial media judgments. Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological
Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 818 (1995)
(stating that the relationship between Souter's predicted and actual voting patterns are
consistent with that of recent Justices). But see Lee Epstein et al., Do Political Preferences
Change? A Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 60 J. POL. 800, 810-13
(1998) (observing various patterns of change in the voting behavior of Justices over time);
Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Buyer Beware? Presidential Success Through Supreme Court
Appointments, 53 POL. RES. Q. 557, 561-68 (2000) (finding that "change in judicial
behavior diminishes the long run impact of presidential appointments"); Andrew D.
Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Bayesian Learning about Ideal Points of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, 1953-1999, at 20-28 (July 23, 2001) (unpublished paper, available at
http://www.csss.washington.edu/papers) (finding that "some justices change over time
even when controlling for the types of cases that come before the Court").
190. Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-
Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 243 (1999) (reporting meta-analysis of existing literature
that confirms the "conventional wisdom that party is a dependable measure of ideology in
modern American courts"); C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time Binding and Theory
Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916-1988, 35
AM. J. POL. Sci. 460, 474 (1991) (reporting significant correlations between judicial and
presidential party variables and voting behavior). Party affiliation is a crude measure of
judicial ideology, however, and can often be misleading without more refined analysis.
See, e.g., JOHN B. GATES, THE SUPREME COURT AND PARTISAN REALIGNMENT 176-83
(1992); Mark A. Graber, Federalist or Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and Party
Politics, 12 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 229, 262-66 (1998); Stefanie A. Lindquist et al., The
Impact of Presidential Appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court: Cohesive and Divisive
Voting within Presidential Blocs, 53 POL. RES. Q. 795, 812-13 (2000); Michael Ebeid,
Influencing the Supreme Court: Democratic Accountability and the Presidential Threat
to Judicial Independence (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file
with author).
191. Cornell W. Clayton, The Supreme Court and Political Jurisprudence: New and
Old Institutionalisms, in SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING 25-26 (Cornell W. Clayton
& Howard Gillman eds., 1999); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of
Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 323, 333-34 (1992); Whittington,
supra note 126, at 619-28. Cf. WALDRON, supra note 24, at 15 (observing that "judges
disagree among themselves along exactly the same lines as the citizens and representatives
do").
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The U.S. Supreme Court is also a collective institution. It
resolves cases by majority rule. Although there is no evidence that
Justices logroll their votes across cases, there is little question that
they negotiate the outcomes of individual cases. Opinions are written
and rewritten so as to attract the support of reluctant colleagues, and
negotiations are held, tactics are employed, and bargains are made as
the agenda is set, decisions are made, and opinions are written.1 2
Such discussions sometimes take the form of reasoned deliberation
over the principles of the case. Often they do not. "Political
compromise" to prevent the "disaffection" of needed allies from the
majority coalition is commonplace on the Court just as it is in other
collective decisionmaking institutions.93  The modem Court also
produces a cacophony of separate opinions that both muffles the
institutional voice of the Court and challenges the notion that the
majority opinion is uniquely principled or reasonable. 94 There is an
external as well as internal politics to judicial decisionmaking.
Although the Court may not be subject to the same form of "pressure
group" politics as elected officials, 19 they are highly dependent on
outside actors to set their agenda, shape their analysis, develop their
arguments, and implement their decisions. 6 The Court is immersed
in its own set of interest groups, from corporate litigants to public
interest legal groups, that seek to influence its decisions. Judicial
192. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 56-111 (1998);
FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT 57-124 (2000)
(examining strategic behavior by Justices in producing opinions); WALTER F. MURPHY,
ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 37-90 (1964).
193. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 34, at 344.
194. David M. O'Brien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On
Reconsidering the Rise of Individual Opinions, in SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING,
supra note 191, at 111 (noting that "when individual opinions are more highly prized than
opinions for the Court, consensus not only declines but the Court's rulings appear more
fragmented, uncertain, less stable, and less predictable").
195. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 34, at 345.
196. CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGI-rrs REVOLUTION 44-70 (1998) (analyzing the extent
to which judicial constitutional interpretation depends on an external "support structure"
of organized interests to sustain litigation campaigns); Lee Epstein, Courts and Interest
Groups, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, 335-71 (John B. Gates
& Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991) (analyzing strategies and effects of interest groups in the
courts); Kevin T. McGuire, The Supreme Court Bar and Institutional Relationships, in THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 115-32 (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton
eds., 1999) ("Perhaps more than any branch of the federal government, the U.S. Supreme
Court is dependent upon individuals outside of government to provide it with information
and analysis to support its policy making."); Mark Silverstein & Benjamin Ginsberg, The
Supreme Court and the New Politics of Judicial Power, 102 POL. SCI. Q. 371,377-82 (1987)
(examining the process by which the Court forged "links with important constituency
groups").
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politics is not the same as legislative politics, but the reasoning of
judicial constitutional interpretation is deeply contested and
implicated in the same considerations as extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation.
B. A Politics of Principle
If the judiciary is not as reasonable and principled as sometimes
portrayed, nonjudicial actors are also more reasonable and principled
than their critics allow. This objection to extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation rests on the assumption that the nonjudicial branches
cannot be trusted to interpret the Constitution, for they will instead
simply act on their prior preferences. Nonjudicial actors are
unprincipled and irrational because they are guided by
"expediency,"'" trade in "power," ' 8 are subject to "pressure,"'99
never engage in "moral debate,"'" and only address "policy" and
"collective goals" while ignoring "principle" and individual rights.2°0
Such claims are empirically overstated, analytically confused, and
normatively ungrounded.
Those who object to extrajudicial constitutional interpretation
offer little specific empirical support for their claims, relying instead
on broad generalizations of the American political process as interest
driven and arbitrary. °" Although there is of course some truth to this
generalization, it obscures the fact that debates over constitutional
principles are recurrent in nonjudicial arenas. Indeed, the existence
of the extrajudicial "great moral debate" is so well known, and so
intense, that it is often embedded within other common labels, such
as the "culture war."2 3 The modern objection to the unprincipled
nature of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation seems to depend
more on the example of the Southern Democrats quashing civil rights
debates in the mid-century Congress than on contemporary politics,
197. BICKEL, supra note 168, at 58; CORWIN, supra note 163, at 64.
198. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 34, at 70; Wechsler, supra note 165, at
19; Wellington, supra note 167, at 246.
199. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 34, at 344; Wellington, supra note 167, at
247.
200. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 34, at 344.
201. DWORKIN, supra note 172, at 22,90-100; DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 69.
202. See, e.g., DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 34, at 344 ("[T]he process is
dominated by political alliances that are formed around a single issue and use the familiar
tactics of pressure groups to bribe or blackmail legislators into voting as they wish.").
203. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS (1992) (describing
origins and contemporary expression of pervasive intellectual and political conflict over
morals).
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in which "social issues" involving basic moral principles and
individual rights have occupied a central place on the legislative and
electoral agenda.2
Political debates on matters of constitutional principle are
common, and form the background against which judicial decisions
themselves are made.205 The Court is not alone in making principled
decisions about constitutional values. It is choosing sides in
preexisting debates. Certainly, the well-known instances in which
Presidents have challenged the judiciary's claim to being the
authoritative interpreter of the Constitution are hard to dismiss as
unreasoned. Thomas Jefferson asserted that the President had an
independent authority to evaluate the constitutionality of the Sedition
Act,206 and his actions followed an extended and careful public debate
over the actions of the Federalist courts and Congress and the
requirements of free speech in a democracy 20 Andrew Jackson's
veto of the National Bank,2 8 largely written by future Chief Justice
Roger Taney,20 9 included an elaborate analysis of the constitutional
and political principles at stake in the case of the Bank and followed
204. See, e.g., RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY 3-14 (1989); EVERETT CARLL LADD JR. & CHARLES D. HADLEY,
TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 340-41 (1975).
205. In the following examples, I lay aside political conflicts over the framework of
government itself, from the war powers to the "fiscal constitution." Such debates are
common, and more likely to be resolved in the political arena than the judicial arena, but
are largely ignored by those who advance this objection to extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation. It may be more responsive to meet the objection on its own favored
ground of rights claims and limitations on government power. But see Louis FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENTpassim (1997);
STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS
68-87 (1996); HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 67-100
(1990); WHITTINGTON, supra note 104, passim; Charles Black, The Working Balance of
the American Political Departments, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, passim (1974); Casper,
Constitutional Organization, supra note 142, at 187-93; Kenneth Dam, The American
Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 279-90 (1977); E. Donald Elliott, INS v.
Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto, 1983
SUP. Cr. REV. 125, 169-73; Whittington, supra note 93, passim.
206. THOMAS JEFFERSON, 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 50-51 (Andrew
A. Lipscomb ed., 1904).
207. See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 282-349 (1985); JAMES
MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETrERS 94-155 (1956); Adrienne Koch & Harry Ammon,
The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in Jefferson's and Madison's Defense
of Civil Liberties, 5 WM. & MARY Q. 147, 147-60 (1948).
208. Andrew Jackson, Veto of National Bank Act, in 3 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576-91 (James Richardson ed., 1897).
209. See CARL B. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 194-200 (1935).
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years of debate on the appropriate scope and use of federal powers.10
Abraham Lincoln's rejection of the Dred Scott Court's understanding
of the nation's constitutional principles is celebrated as foundational,
and itself built on years of constitutional analysis by antislavery
forces.211 Franklin Roosevelt's denunciation of the Court's rulings of
the mid-1930s was likewise grounded in decades of popular and
scholarly debate on the purposes of government power and the scope
of individual liberties. In what sense is it useful to assert that the
Human Rights Bill1 of the 1980s or the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act 14 of the 1990s was unprincipled or reflected "naked
power?"2 ' Continuing extrajudicial debates over affirmative action,
euthanasia, the death penalty, pornography, school prayer, gay rights,
210. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 64, at 6-21 (documenting the newspaper exchange
over the McCulloch case); Whittington, supra note 63, at 365-77 (examining political
debate over scope of federal powers).
211. LINCOLN, supra note 51, at 585-86. See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR
SECRET CONSTITUTION: How LINCOLN REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001)
(reexamining the principles underlying the Reconstruction Amendments); JAMES M.
MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 33-42
(1991) (describing Lincoln as foundational to postbellum constitutionalism); WILLIAM M.
WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-
1848 (1977) (describing antecedents to Lincoln's antislavery constitutionalism); GARRY
WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 121-47
(1992) (examining the Gettysburg Address).
212. See generally ALAN DAWLEY, STRUGGLES FOR JUSTICE: SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LIBERAL STATE (1991) (discussing the history underlying the
New Deal from the 1890s to 1938); SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-
WELFARE STATE: A STUDY OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865-1901, at 373-
400 (1956) (chronicling the early twentieth-century debate over activist government);
WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937 (1994) (discussing the half-century of debate
supporting Franklin Roosevelt's criticism of the Supreme Court).
213. S. 158,97th Cong. (1982).
214. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000). This is not to say that Congress gave a
full accounting of the issues involved in such legislation or that organized interests were
not central to their progress. As with most legislation, members of Congress worked
closely with representatives of affected interests in the development of the RFRA. See
Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REv. 1, 12-17 (1994). Likewise, in attempting to
correct the Court on the broader principles of religious freedom, Congress was also willing
to delegate a variety of subsidiary and potentially controversial and important issues to the
judiciary. On the politics of the RFRA, see, for example, id. at 12-21. On congressional
delegation of issues, see generally DAVID ESPTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN,
DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY
MAKING UNDER SEPARATION OF POWERS 196-231 (1999) (discussing congressional
delegation powers); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 35, 37-45 (1993) (examining
Congress's deference to the Supreme Court on difficult policy issues).
215. Wechsler, supra note 165, at 19.
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Internet privacy, sexual harassment, and gun control reflect sustained
concern with individual rights, constitutional values, and political
principles. We may disagree with the conclusions that various
extrajudicial bodies reach in these debates, as we may disagree with
the conclusions of the courts, but it is difficult to maintain that such
extrajudicial decisions are unconsidered or neglect considerations of
justice and principle. Indeed, it is possible for extrajudicial
institutions to give greater solicitude and to be more capable of
responding to individual rights concerns than judicial bodies bound
by the limits of legal interpretation and dispute resolution. Examples
abound, such as when California and Arizona voters attempted to
accommodate the medical use of marijuana21 6 or the Illinois governor
suspended the use of capital punishment given doubts about trial and
sentencing procedures217 or voters in a number of municipalities
extended civil rights protections to homosexuals2 18 or the Vermont
legislature moved to recognize homosexual unions or when state
and federal legislatures created procedures for opening government
meetings and files to citizen scrutiny.220 Courts have, of course, been
useful in drawing attention to particular, unconsidered problems in
the application of government policies, but there is little reason for
favoring the judiciary's value judgments about those policies over
those of extrajudicial institutions. 1
Such decisions by political bodies may still be regarded as
"expedient" in the sense that the proffered constitutional
interpretations may converge with political preferences and electoral
ambitions. It is difficult to know what to make of such a complaint,
however. To the extent that such interpretive efforts are mere
rationalizations of policy preferences that were arrived at
216. John Balzar, Voters Approve Measures to Use Pot as Medicine, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
6, 1996, at Al.
217. Maureen O'Donnell, Illinois to Stop Executions; Ryan Panel to Study 13 Wrongful
Convictions, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 31, 2000, at 3.
218. See, e.g., Gay Rights Winning Some Votes, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Apr. 21,
1991, at 16A; Aaron Epstein, Gay Rights in America; A Supreme Court Case, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Oct. 9, 1995, at Al.
219. John Bacon & Haya El Nasser, Vermont Governor Signs Gay-Union Bill, USA
TODAY, Apr. 27, 2000, at 3A.
220. See LEROY N. RIESELBACH, CONGRESSIONAL REFORM: THE CHANGING
MODERN CONGRESS 57-58 (1994); Harold C. Relyea, Opening Government to Public
Scrutiny: A Decade of Federal Efforts, 35 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 3,3 (1975).
221. See generally TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT
240 (1999) ("[G]reater precision in the design and execution of policies may result from
the Court's intervention in the face of unacceptable consequences in the individual and
perhaps marginal case.").
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independently, they may still constrain political decisionmaking to
those positions for which plausible justifications can be found. The
judge's obligation to write a formal opinion justifying her vote can do
nothing more. Even if the legislative result is expedient in the sense
that it conforms to existing policy preferences, such debates still raise
and resolve issues of justice and do so in a rationally defensible
manner. More basically, it seems implausible that politicians do not
act out of mixed motives in such cases. Ultimately, the normative
evaluation of Lincoln's opposition to slavery and his interpretation of
constitutional principles on this point does not turn on a parsing of his
sincere belief that slavery was contrary to American ideals and his
strategic calculation that the slavery issue was his ticket to political
success. Both judicial and nonjudicial actors can act expediently, but
that does not mean that they do not also act on principles.
In addition to being empirically questionable, the objection to
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation is also analytically
problematic. The ready assertion that "power" not "reason"
characterizes nonjudicial bodies and precludes extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation is theoretically underdeveloped. M
Although it is true that "[n]o legislature or executive is obligated by
the nature of its function to support its choice of values by the type of
reasoned explanation" contained in court opinions,m it is false to
assume that individual politicians do not therefore have to explain
and justify their actions. Legislators are no different than justices in
the sense that both are political actors with constituencies and
colleagues from whom they must gain support by justifying their
votes. Admittedly, the modes of legitimate argument available to
legislators are more extensive than those available to judges. It is a
sufficient explanation within legislative debate for a representative to
justify her vote with reference to the material interests or preferences
of her constituents. Such appeals may explain an individual vote, but
they are still unlikely to persuade colleagues to throw their own
support behind a measure, and building coalitions from diverse
individuals remains a central element of the political process.' It is
222. The classic statement is Wechsler, supra note 165, at 14-15 ("[P]rinciples are
largely instrumental as they are employed in politics ... and are reduced to a manipulative
tool.").
223. 1& at 15.
224. JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONs 49 (3d ed. 1989)
("Part of the process of building a coalition around a given piece of legislation, for
instance, is providing potential members of the coalition with handy explanations that they
can use in case the vote gives them some trouble back home. They may not join the
coalition without such an explanation.").
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precisely the "politicization" of issues by their entry into the
legislative arena that subverts the importance of narrow private
interests and necessitates appeals to broader, "public" interests.
5
Perhaps more importantly, the explanation and justification of
legislators' decisions to their home constituents is a central aspect of
their political task, though such activities are more likely to be found
in the "unofficial" dealings of legislators with their constituents than
in their official work in the capital. 26 As John Kingdon concluded in
his seminal study of congressional voting decisions, "Congressmen
are constantly called upon to explain to constituents why they voted
as they did. In the process of answering mail and talking with
constituents, questions asking them to justify their votes are put to
them repeatedly." 227  Within a congressional district, it is not
necessarily self-evident that a given legislative decision is what the
voters want. Congressmen routinely strive to persuade their
constituents that their votes in Congress were the correct ones, or at
least reasonable ones that the constituents should tolerate from their
representatives. Every congressional vote has the potential to
become a campaign issue, and thus congressmen must be able to
develop a compelling explanation for each one. Congressional votes
are the raw material for an opposition's campaign. Though relatively
few issues are likely to be highlighted in any given campaign, the
electorally salient issues and votes are not readily predictable ahead
of time. Even if a legislator is not forced to develop a complete
justification for every vote cast, she must be convinced that such a
justification could be elaborated if necessary.
Congressional decisions are deeply affected by whether
compelling justifications for a given vote can be found, whether a
legislator believes that he could persuade his constituents that his
decision was a reasonable one.8 Justifying legislative votes is not
simply a matter of pandering to voters back home, in part because the
voters back home are likely to be diverse but open to reason. Far
225. For a classic statement of this dynamic, see E.E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, THE
SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 23-43
(1960).
226. This justificatory aspect of the representative task is often taken as a given by
those focusing on the internal operation of Congress, but the centrality and difficulty of
the task of conveying information between legislators and constituents are at the core of
the modern political science literature on interest groups.
227. KINGDON, supra note 224, at 47.
228. d. at 47-54; R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
64-87 (1990); RICHARD F. FENNO JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR
DISTRICrs 141-46 (1978).
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from confirming the stereotype that legislators "trim and shape their
speech and votes" in order to manipulate the electorateu 9 studies of
congressional behavior indicate that "House members give the same
explanations for their Washington activity before people who
disagree with them as they give before people who agree with
them.""2 Moreover, explanations of legislative behavior are not only
designed to reinforce existing constituent beliefs but also to build
trust and enhance "voting leeway."' 31 Legislators cannot behave in an
"arbitrary" fashion and expect to receive support from voters,
interested groups, or legislative colleagues, nor can they be seen as
being under the thumb of organized interests who do not represent
the views of the legislators' constituencies. They must be able, when
asked, to offer public reasons for their actions. Far from being alien
to nonjudicial institutions, principled reasoning is necessitated by the
structural and electoral incentives of the political process. Judges and
legislators do not face the same incentives or reason about issues in
the same way, and these differences may be the bases for making
useful distinctions between the constitutional tasks of judges and
legislators. But it is important to recognize that the necessity for a
legislator to regularly hold "town hall meetings" to explain himself to
his constituents is not unrelated to the necessity for a judge to write
an opinion to explain himself to litigants and colleagues. Unlike
judges, however, who are often expected to explain themselves,
legislators strive to anticipate the need for explanation and avoid
decisions that might require explicit and potentially contested
justifications. In the representative context, the ever-present
requirement that decisions be justifiable insures that most
justifications can go unstated.
The complaint about the use of "power" in this context is also
analytically problematic. The complaint about power politics could
refer to the legislative process itself-that is, extrajudicial
constitutional interpretations depend on gaining majority support in
order to be successful, and majority interpretations trump minority
interpretations. Of course, the requirement that constitutional
interpretations gain majority support before becoming authoritative
is to this degree no different in Congress than on the Court. The
ultimate interpreter on the bench is the judicial majority, who
overpowers the minority through voting. Those who would influence
229. Wechsler, supra note 165, at 14-15.
230. FENNO, supra note 228, at 157.
231. Id. at 151.
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or join the majority must necessarily compromise and overcome their
doubts in order to do so. In the context of public disagreement, we,
whether justices, legislators or voters, are necessarily "pressured" by
the possibility of not having our favored interpretations adopted. As
Jeremy Waldron has cogently argued, decisiveness in the context of
disagreement is the unavoidable "circumstance of politics," regardless
of the institution that must make the decision. 2
A central ambiguity in this objection to extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation is the appropriate independence of the
interpreter. Presumably the concern with pressure, manipulation,
and power refers to the concern that interpreters might be influenced
to do something that they might not otherwise do. 3  Judicial
reasoning is valued in part because it is independent. Judges, ex
hypothesi, act "sincerely," voting their own mind and advancing their
own best interpretive judgment.4 But nonjudicial actors are not free
agents. They may either exercise their own interpretive judgment or
be influenced by the electoral pressure of constituents or
intermediate actors such as parties and interest groups. It is not clear
that nonjudicial actors should exercise their own independent
judgment in this sense, however. They are, after all, representatives,
and we would normally expect them to be responsive to the opinions
of their constituents. If representatives feel electoral pressure to
reflect the interpretive judgment of those they represent, then this
may not be a normatively problematic pressure. At the same time,
there is no a priori reason to dismiss the interpretive judgments of the
citizenry, especially once we accept that constitutional decisions are
more about value judgments than about technical legal judgments. In
practice, the evidence suggests there is a continuing dialogue and
adjustment between representatives and their constituentsY 5 Elected
officials in the United States act as both "trustees" and "delegates. '26
232. WALDRON, supra note 24, at 102.
233. See generally Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI. 201, 202-03
(1957) ("A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would
not otherwise do.").
234. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 160 (5th ed. 1995)
("[B]ecause the Court has a degree of freedom from environmental pressures, policy
preferences may play a larger role in its collective choices than they do in legislatures and
administrative agencies."); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 189, at 73.
235. See FENNO, supra note 228, at 141-46, 151-54, 168-69; KINGDON, supra note 224,
at 48-49.
236. FENNO, supra note 228, at 161 (Representatives "use delegate and trustee
justifications because both are legitimating concepts."); see also HANNA F. PITKIN, THE
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 144--67 (1967) (examining delegate and trustee
conceptions of representation).
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Nonetheless, as one congressman explained, "If your conscience and
your district disagree too often.., you're in the wrong business." 237
Successful representatives reflect their electorates, without the need
for a separate "power politics." 238
If pressure from below is normatively unproblematic,239 pressure
from the outside is empirically unlikely. Political parties in the
United States are notoriously weak.240 The power of legislative
leaders is conditional on agreement within the party; they are
facilitators, not dictators.241 Fellow partisans vote together because,
and when, they want to, not because they have to.22  Often parties
organize around such agreements on fundamental constitutional
issues, reducing potentially crosscutting tensions and enhancing the
capacity of individuals to effectuate their interpretations. 243 Likewise,
the power of interest groups comes from their capacity to better link
representatives and their constituents. "Interest groups achieve
237. FENNO, supra note 228, at 142.
238. See generally Robert S. Erikson & Gerald C. Wright, Voters, Candidates, and
Issues in Congressional Elections, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 145-53 (Lawrence C.
Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 6th ed. 1997) (noting that one way candidates can
win and hold seats is to represent the ideological preferences of the district); KREHBIEL,
supra note 130, at 223-24 (arguing that politicians who do not adhere to their constituents'
preferences suffer at the polls).
239. "Pressure from below" may still be normatively problematic from the perspective
of enforcing constitutional limits on democratic majorities. This concern is addressed in
Part IV.
240. See, e.g., JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? 3-61 (1995) (arguing that parties
serve rather than constrain officeholders); DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE
ELECTORAL CONNECTION 22 (1974) ("In America the underpinnings of 'teamsmanship'
are weak or absent, making it possible for politicians to triumph over parties."); E.E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 131-32 (1942) ("[T]he parties are unable to
hold their lines in a controversial public issue when the pressure is on... and [this)
condition constitutes the most important single fact concerning the American parties.");
Keith Krehbiel, Where's the Party?, 23 B. J. POL. SCI. 235,242-55 (1993).
241. DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HOUSE 31-34
(1991); see, e.g., Joseph Cooper & David W. Brady, Institutional Context and Leadership
Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn, 75 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 411, 415-17, 423-24
(1981).
242. See David W. Brady et al., The Decline of Party in the U.S. House of
Representatives, 1887-1968, 4 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 381, 394-96, 403-05 (1979); Melissa P.
Collie, The Rise of Coalition Politics: Voting in the U.S. House, 1933-1980, 13 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 321, 329-38 (1988); Joseph Cooper & Garry Young, Partisanship,
Bipartisanship, and Crosspartisanship in Congress Since the New Deal, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED, supra note 238, at 255-71 ("[A]lthough partisan Houses and Senates
have emerged in the 1990s, it is far from certain that the country has entered a partisan
era.").
243. See, e.g., POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 151, at 86-114 (observing the basic
coherence of party voting patterns, with cross-cutting issues such as abortion being
gradually absorbed into the partisan structure).
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influence through the acquisition and strategic transmission of
information that legislators need to make good public policy and get
reelected."'244 Interest groups help political actors evaluate the likely
response of constituents to their actions. Legislators must make
decisions in a highly uncertain electoral and policy environment.
Interest groups are among the means that legislators use to reduce
that uncertainty, and they are influential to the extent that they are
useful in doing so and can do so better than competing sources of
information, including parties, media, opinion polling, and the
legislator's own efforts.245 Interest groups are effective and influential
to the extent that they can make it easier for legislators to explain and
justify their voting decisions. It is notable that "citizen groups" who
focus largely on such issues of principle can be and are quite effective
in influencing legislative decisions precisely because they can mobilize
such resources.246 Nonjudicial actors seek to anticipate voter response
to their decisions, and the pressure they feel reflects only the
difficulty of that task.247
The real issue is not whether extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation and principled deliberation exists, but whether it
should in any way be regarded as authoritative. It is not necessary at
this point to ask whether such efforts have ultimate authority, capable
of trumping contrary judicial interpretations. In some instances, they
may. More basically, we must inquire into whether extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation is entitled to any deference at all or it
should be treated as presumptively irrational and tainted. That issue
can be better examined in the context of the third objection to
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation.
IV. THIRD OBJECTION: IT'S TYRANNICAL
A final objection to extrajudicial constitutional interpretation
also hinges on the role that the Court might play within the larger
political system. Judicial supremacy, in this view, is regarded "as a
244. JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS 2 (1996); see also id. at 7
("Clearly, groups do not get their way simply by applying pressure to elected
representatives.").
245. JOHN MARK HANSEN, GAINING ACCESS 5, 11-22 (1991); Richard A. Smith,
Advocacy, Interpretation, and Influence in the U.S. Congress, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 44, 59
(1984).
246. JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM 87-118 (1999) (analyzing the
influence of liberal public interest groups); WRIGHT, supra note 244, at 8.
247. R. Douglas Arnold, Can Inattentive Citizens Control Their Elected
Representatives?, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED supra note 238, at 401-16.
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permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system" 24s
because the Court alone functions as a countermajoritarian institution
securing the liberties of individuals and political minorities. In the
early 1960s, Alexander Bickel famously referred to the Court's
"counter-majoritarian difficulty. '249  The core reality of judicial
review is that the Court "thwarts the will of representatives of the
actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf
of the prevailing majority, but against it."20 For Bickel, still rooted in
the New Deal liberalism that did battle with the Lochner v. New York
Court, the judiciary's countermajoritarian character was a disability
requiring special rationalization 1' Many others, however, celebrate
precisely this feature of the Court and worry that it will be lost if
judicial review is detached from judicial supremacy. Judicial
independence and judicial supremacy may be regarded as the twin
bulwarks of liberty within American constitutionalism, ensuring that
political majorities and their elected representatives do not trample
the Constitution underfoot1
2
Unless the judiciary can stand against elected officials and
authoritatively define constitutional meaning, the limits on political
power might be lost.Y3 The Supreme Court has recently made this
connection explicit, quoting Marbury to the effect that "[ijf Congress
could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's
meaning, no longer would the Constitution be 'superior paramount
law, unchangeable by ordinary means.' "I The Court is needed not
merely to prevent the occasional abuse of power that arises when
particular government actions violate constitutional provisions, but
more importantly to prevent the systematic dismantling of restraints
on political power through legislative redefinition of constitutional
meaning. Alexander Hamilton suggested this broader significance of
248. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
249. The "counter-majoritarian difficulty" is the problem of justifying judicial review as
a "present instrument of government," given the assumption that judicial review is
"undemocratic." BICKEL, supra note 168, at 16.
250. Id. at 17.
251. On Bickel and his understanding of democracy, see LAURA KALMAN, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 37-41 (1996).
252. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 171, at 140 ("Law judges are called independent
when.., their judgments in particular cases are sealed off from the communicated desires,
preferences, and even considered legal judgments of other public officials and the citizenry
at large.").
253. See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 58, at 110-59 (discussing "popular
sovereignty and its interplay with originalism as a tool of constitutional interpretation").
254. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
[Vol. 80
EXTRA JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
the judiciary when he emphasized that the "complete independence
of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited
Constitution." The "courts were designed to be an intermediary body
between the people and the legislature in order, among other things,
to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority."' 5 The
Constitution delegates authority to the legislature, and judicial
supremacy insures that Congress cannot alter the terms of that
authority and put the servant "above his master." 6 Alexander and
Schauer are likewise sympathetic to this objection, contending that
"there are few examples of Congress subjugating its own policy views
to its views about constitutional constraints." 7  They ultimately
prefer that the judiciary rather than some other institution settle
contested constitutional meanings in part because "constitutions are
designed to guard against the excesses of the majoritarian forces that
influence legislatures and executives more than they influence
courts."258
The countermajoritarian Court may be useful for vindicating
politically unpopular conceptions of justice as well as for enforcing
the terms of the constitutional delegation of political power to the
government. It is popular government and the "people themselves"
that sometimes create threats to the realization of justice and rights. 9
An independent judiciary that will not "consult popularity" but rather
will deliberate on fundamental principles is essential to the goals of
constitutional government.260 Hamilton contended that such threats
would be transitory, but some of his contemporaries and more recent
commentators have argued that such threats are endemic to
democratic government. John Marshall criticized "the wild and
enthusiastic democracy" that "brought annually into doubt principles
which I thought most sound,"26' and his fellow Federalists more
aggressively argued that an independent judiciary was necessary "to
protect [the people] from the violence of their own passions."262 In
his 1892 presidential address to the American Bar Association, John
255. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 161, at 466.
256. Id. at 467.
257. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 31, at 1368.
258. Id. at 1378 n.80.
259. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 161, at 469.
260. Id. at 471.
261. Nelson, supra note 158, at 932 (quoting AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY
JOHN MARSHALL 9-10 (J. Adams ed., 1937)).
262. 2 TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE, AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 20 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1805) (statement of Joseph
Hopkinson).
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Dillon explained that the "people had effectually protected
themselves against themselves ... by providing that the Constitution
should be interpreted and enforced by the judiciary," for in the
modern era "what is now to be feared and guarded against is the
despotism of the many-of the majority."263  Judicial supremacy
provides an escape from what the great Jeffersonian iconoclast John
Randolph called "King Numbers" and Ronald Dworkin has labeled
"statistical democracy."2" Unfettered by political interests or popular
prejudices, the judiciary can penetrate to the true meaning of the
Constitution and the subtle requirements of its principled
commitments. The lack of judicial interest in the outcome of
constitutional inquiries insures better interpretive reasoning.265 Some
questions-questions of justice and rights-are too important to be
left in the hands of legislative majorities. Judicial supremacy insures
that they are not.
This objection to extrajudicial constitutional interpretation
misestimates the political dynamics of these competing institutions
while employing a problematic framework for understanding the
normative purpose of constitutional interpretation. In general, courts
are not as countermajoritarian and nonjudicial actors are not as
relentlessly majoritarian as this objection assumes. As a
consequence, extrajudicial constitutional interpretation need not
subvert "the best principles of political morality" in order to serve
"the majority's will" as is often assumed.266 This is an analytical as
well as an empirical claim. Analytically, it is not clear that
countermajoritarianism is the best way of understanding the process
and goals of constitutional interpretation. Although we may prefer
that the interpretive process be principled rather than willful, it need
not be separated from politics in order to achieve that objective.
It should be emphasized that this response need not question the
utility of judicial review itself. The belief in a countermajoritarian
Court capable of enforcing a higher law Constitution often obscures
the distinction between judicial supremacy, the authoritative
settlement of contested constitutional principles, judicial review, and
the correction of particular unconstitutional acts. Judicial review may
263. John F. Dillon, Address of the President, in REPORT OF THE FIFrEENTH
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 167,203,206 (1892).
264. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-
1830, at 321 (1830); DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 34, at 20.
265. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 171, at 86-89 ("It makes little sense to allow the
majoritarian process to decide what should be protected from itself.").
266. DWORKIN, supra note 31, at 70.
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be valuable in checking democratic excesses and in calling attention
to majoritarian abuses and the plight of political minorities without
the added authority of judicial supremacy. Nonjudicial actors are too
often presumed to be tyrannical, and the proper limits on democratic
action are too often assumed to be uncontroversial. Such
assumptions can be rejected without suggesting that the nonjudicial
actors "could disregard virtually all judicial rulings" and the
"antimajoritarian check" of judicial review should be abandoned. 67
It can be readily granted that the Court should have the power to
nullify government actions that clearly violate constitutional
requirements, that concerns with majority tyranny can help justify
that power, and that the Constitution embodies significant
countermajoritarian principles.261 The more difficult question is
whether the Court's interpretation of the Constitution should
predominate when the political branches act on their own alternative
but reasonable constitutional understandings.
A. A Countermajoritarian Court?
Rendering the judiciary the authoritative constitutional
interpreter is unlikely to produce significantly more
countermajoritarian interpretations than would extrajudicial
interpretation. The courts have not been a reliable
countermajoritarian force in American politics. Federal judges may
be protected by their life terms, but they are carefully selected by
political actors. Presidents are unlikely to select, and the Senate is
unlikely to confirm, individuals whose views diverge too sharply from
the political mainstream, or indeed from the partisan commitments of
the current officeholders.269 The inclination of individual judges is
ultimately less important than the institution of the judiciary as a
whole, and the collective portrait of the judiciary is routinely shaped
by current majorities. Vacancies occur regularly-every 1.89 years
267. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 171, at 96.
268. See generally WHrITINGTON, supra note 58, at 168 (originalist court may actively
use judicial review); Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding,
and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 121, 165-76 (1996) (discussing
framers' intent and original understanding of the Constitution and how the amendment
process embodies constraints on democracy).
269. Sheldon Goldman, Federal Judicial Recruitment, in THE AMERICAN COURTS,
supra note 196, at 193-194, 201; see also PERETr, supra note 221, at 84-93 (citing
"[n]umerous studies [that have] consistently confirm[ed] that political factors, particularly
partisanship, are paramount and persistent in the [P]resident's recruitment and selection
of judicial nominees").
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for the Supreme CourtE°--giving current majorities an opportunity to
control the bench. The lower courts have been regularly restructured
and expanded, providing new posts to be filled and altering the
overall balance of the judiciary. Furthermore, the institutional
mission of the federal judiciary is subject to statutory controls
reflecting the goals of elected officials27 Even an independent-
minded judiciary must worry about the political reaction to its
decisions and the complications of implementation, leading judges to
temper their rulings and opinions so as to accommodate political
realities.272
Sometimes lagging, sometimes leading their colleagues in the
other branches of government, judges have not been systematically
nor significantly countermajoritarian. Judges are subject to many of
the same shifts in public mood and political and social circumstances
that affect elected officials. As Justice Benjamin Cardozo noted,
judges "do not stand aloof on these chill and distant heights .... The
great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn
aside in their course and pass the judges by."' 73 Judges are neither
immune from the social pressures of public opinion nor insulated
from public debates on constitutional issues.274 In racist times, judges
270. In the 213 years between 1789 and 2002, 113 Justices have served on the Supreme
Court. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, at
http://supremecourtus.gov/aboutlmembers.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2002).
271. DEBORAH J. BARROW ET AL., THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE 27-64 (1996); Dahl, supra note 132, at 288; John M. DeFigueiredo & Emerson
H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of
Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. & ECON. 435, 459-60 (1996); Gillman, supra
note 186.
272. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 138-81 (1998);
WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 123-75 (1964); Mark A.
Graber, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues: Cohens v. Virginia and the Problematic
Establishment of Judicial Power, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 67,67 (1995).
273. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
274. J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES
AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 3-13,244-54 (1971); Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood,
The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy
Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 468,470,492-94 (1997); Ronald Kahn, Institutional Norms and
the Historical Development of Supreme Court Politics: Changing "Social Facts" and
Doctrinal Development, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note
196, at 43-59; William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court
Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 87, 96-98 (1993); Kevin T. McGuire & James A.
Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court
Responsiveness to Public Preferences (April 27, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
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are likely to reflect the culturally dominant racial beliefs.275 When
national elites are concerned that property rights are in danger, then
the judiciary is likely to be sympathetic to those concerns.276
Members of the judiciary are likely to be responsive when national
officials argue that Southern racial policies interfere with the
country's international goals or restrictions on civil liberties are
necessary to the war effort.2 77 The Justices feel social shifts such as
the rise of the women's movement in the 1960s and 1970s, just as
other officials, and members of the general public, do.278 Even
Warren era judicial activism is largely consistent with the majority
preferences of the time.279 The courts may not be as responsive as
elected officials are to shifts in public opinion, but the courts have
rarely been significantly out-of-step with the political mainstream for
long.O
This is not to say that the judicial power to interpret the
Constitution makes no difference to political outcomes and is of no
consequence. Mark Tushnet probably overstates the case in asserting
that "judicial review basically amounts to noise around zero" and that
"vigorous judicial review does not make much difference one way or
the other," but his skepticism of the ultimate value of judicial review
is certainly warranted.281 Judges are both constrained and motivated
by the existing political climate. In the context of constitutional
interpretation at least, judges are not merely the agents of legislative
majorities. They have room to take independent action and exercise
their own constitutional judgments.R On many issues, there may be
275. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT 19-35 (1993); Michael
J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SuP. Cr. REv. 303,304-06.
276. See generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 1-100 (1993)
(examining the Lochner era conservatism and the response to social and economic
concerns of the time); ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF
LAW 61-81 (1960) (analyzing economic conservatism of legal and judicial elite).
277. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS 79-114 (2000); LUCAS A. POWE,
JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 34-37 (2000).
278. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolttions, 82 VA. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1996); Ronald Kahn & Susan Dennehy, New
Historical Institutionalism, Precedential Social Constructs, and Doctrinal Change: Gender
Discrimination in the Twentieth Century (Mar. 25, 1999) (unpublished paper, on file with
the authors).
279. POWE, supra note 277, at 485-99; David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and
Public Opinion: Judicial Decision Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. POL. 652,
655-64 (1985); Klarman, supra note 278, at 31-66.
280. Stimson et al., supra note 132, at 551-56.
281. TUSHNET, supra note 17, at 153,174.
282. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Deference to Congress: An Examination of
the Marksist Model, in SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING, supra note 191, at 237-53.
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no firm majority, or at least not an effective majority that agrees on a
specific constitutional rule. In such cases, the Court can be effective
in defining the range of options and potentially in specifying a
particular rule from within that range. Legislators may not have
independently settled on the particular trimester scheme laid down by
the Court in Roe, for example, but there was widespread public and
political support for some liberalization of abortion laws and the
courts were not alone in expanding abortion rights in the early
1970s. 83 Likewise, the judiciary may exploit the varying intensity of
political preferences and the difficulties of agenda setting and
collective action in the political arena to advance their own
constitutional agenda. The Court's protection of flag burning, for
example, advanced free speech principles, but in an area of relatively
low political salience. Somewhat differently, the Warren Court
focused attention on flaws in the criminal justice system that were
unlikely to attract legislative interest. The judiciary may also correct
small-scale injustices by bringing outliers into line with mainstream
norms, in part because what "shocks the conscience" of judges is
likely to be shocking to the wider public as well.2S5 The Court can
make a significant difference in political life at the margin1 6 But the
Court's constitutional interpretations are most important when it acts
in concert with or in the absence of political majorities rather than as
a strongly countermajoritarian force, when judicial interpretation
converges with rather than diverges from extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation.' Judicial constitutional interpretation is unlikely to
be significantly more countermajoritarian than is extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation, though the judiciary may be able to
283. See DEVINS, supra note 17, at 58-60; GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE 182-84 (1991); Friedman, supra note 37, at 658-68.
284. Friedman, supra note 37, at 605-06. Given the symbolic significance of the issue,
it is unsurprising that legislators would rush to take a position on it and invite the Court to
reverse itself in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). In contrast to the
Communism cases of the 1950s, however, the flag-burning issue is unlikely to motivate
legislators to punish the Court. On the reaction to the security cases of the 1950s, see
WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 127-241 (1962).
285. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,172 (1952).
286. Exactly what the consequences of judicial action might be are not always
predictable. By intervening in ongoing political controversies, the Court might further
polarize the antagonists and produce significant backlash effects rather than effectively
advance its own goals. See Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The
Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81, 82-83, 110-18 (1994); Klarman, supra note 77, at 188-
94.
287. See POWE, supra note 277, 487-97; Mark A. Graber, Federalist or Friends of
Adams: The Marshall Court and Party Politics, 12 STuD. AM. POL. DEv. 229, 247-62
(1998); Graber, supra note 214, at 36.
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identify constitutional applications and violations that would
otherwise escape political notice. Such a limited brief for judicial
review, however, hardly justifies judicial supremacy.
B. The Overstated Fear of Majoritarian Tyranny
Extrajudicial constitutional interpretation need not be as
majoritarian, or as tyrannous, as this objection implies. Some may
argue that courts and legislatures are more similar than commonly
assumed because legislatures can also be relatively impervious to
electoral constraints and popular majorities. This is not my argument,
and such claims are overstated. It is true, for example, that "despite
the need to stand for election, legislators are serving every bit as long
as unelected judges, and periodic elections do not appear to threaten
this state of affairs significantly."2  Such considerations as
incumbency reelection rates or popular support for legislative terms
limits are not sufficient to establish that legislators are actually
unresponsive to public opinion or are themselves
countermajoritarian, however. Regular elections give legislators
great incentives to be responsive to public concerns, and incumbent
reelection rates indicate how successful modern legislators are at that
task. 9 Post facto stability does not indicate ex ante security, and
legislators invest substantial resources toward insuring that they are
not out-of-step with their constituents on issues that matter.2 90 Given
the inherent constraints of diverse political preferences and the
difficulties of collective action, there is little reason to believe that
elected officials are systematically unresponsive to their electorates.
Elected officials may be responsive and accountable to the public
will, but they are not therefore purely majoritarian in their actions.
The very insecurity of elective office discourages nonjudicial officials
from ignoring minority interests. Politicians gain security in office by
servicing broad, heterogeneous constituencies, not by relying on a
288. Friedman, supra note 37, at 610.
289. See John R. Alford & David W. Brady, Personal and Partisan Advantage in U.S.
Congressional Elections, 1846-1990, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 238, at
145-49; Stephen Ansolabehere et aL, Old Voters, New Voters, and the Personal Vote:
Using Redistricting to Measure Incumbency Advantage, 44 AM. J. POL. Sci. 17, 24-28
(2000); Brad Lockerbie, The Partisan Component of the Incumbency Advantage: 1956-
1996,52 POL. RES. Q. 631,642-43 (1999).
290. See THOMAS E. MANN, UNSAFE AT ANY MARGIN 44-46, 73-74 (1978); Erikson
& Wright, supra note 238, at 132-61; George Serra & David Moon, Casework, Issue
Positions, and Voting in Congressional Elections: A District Analysis, 56 J. POL. 200, 200-
01,204-11 (1994).
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homogeneous but narrow group of supporters.291 Inattention to issues
that are of intense interest to a few can provide openings for a serious
electoral challenge, and thus elected officials strive to anticipate and
defuse such potential challenges and eliminate the base of support for
potential challengers.02 Most congressmen win reelection by large
majorities, and those who rely on the support of slim majorities are
soon replaced.293 Partisan supporters constitute the core rather than
the total of a successful legislator's electoral constituency.
29 4
This district-level dynamic is also played out at the legislative
level and is further reinforced by structural features of the American
political and constitutional system. Most congressional legislation,
both important and trivial, is passed by large majorities and enjoys
broad, bipartisan (or at least, crosspartisan) support 9.2  Even in the
context of partisan votes in the contemporary Congress, there are a
substantial number of defections to the legislative majority. For
example, even the controversial elements of the Republican's
Contract with America attracted, on average, over a third of the
Democratic representatives.296  Often the most significant
consequence of partisanship is stalemate, as partisan majorities are
unable to overcome the many obstacles to legislative success.29
291. See MAYHEW, supra note 240, at 18, 46-77; Alford & Brady, supra note 289, at
150-54; Gary C. Jacobson, Running Scared& Elections and Congressional Politics in the
1980s, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLIcY 39-81 (Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry
Sullivan eds., 1987); Richard Herrera & Michael Yawn, The Emergence of the Personal
Vote, 61 J. POL. 136, 141-49 (1999). At the same time, it is possible for legislative districts
and party primaries to become internally more homogeneous, which would influence
legislative behavior accordingly. Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, The Polarization of
American Politics, 46 J. POL. 1061, 1069-74 (1984) (describing "increasing polarization of
the underlying support coalitions" of senators); Tushnet, supra note 182, at 43-51
(pointing out that elections have become less party-centered and more candidate-
centered, thus changing the face of elections and service in office).
292. Arnold, supra note 247, at 414.
293. See Alford & Brady, supra note 289, at 142-49; Monica Bauer & R. John Hibbing,
Which Incumbents Lose in House Elections: A Response to Jacobson's "The Marginals
Never Vanished," 33 AM. J. POL. Sci. 262,264-66 (1989).
294. FENNO, supra note 228, at 1-30.
295. See ARNOLD, supra note 228, at 117-18; KREHBIEL, supra note 130, at 5-6, 84-85;
DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING AND
INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-1990, at 119-35 (1991).
296. See JAMES G. GIMPEL, LEGISLATING THE REVOLUTION 119-21,152-53 (1996).
297. See, e.g., Cooper & Young, supra note 242, at 269 ("[A] stable partisan majority
still cannot produce major policy outcomes by adopting a partisan mode of operation....
[T]he passage of major legislation still requires forms of behavior and negotiation that are
coalitional...."); Carroll J. Doherty, Partisanship Returns to the Hill, Limiting Legislative
Output, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2824,2824 (Nov. 15, 1997) (noting that the reason why
the 105th Congress failed to send some bills to the President was because these bills "were
the object of fierce political warfare between Republicans and Democrats").
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American parties do not have the capacity to enforce legislative
discipline. This creates both the necessity and the opportunity for
substantive legislative coalitions to be formed by reaching across
party lines.298 The heterogeneity of the Congress and the American
electorate and electoral uncertainty have encouraged the
development of legislative norms of "universalism" that incorporate
nearly everybody rather than "minimum winning coalitions" that
impose their will on large losing minorities. 9 These pressures toward
universalism are reinforced by the necessity of winning support across
a bicameral legislature and the executive branch. The different size
and constituencies of the House, Senate and executive create tensions
between them that must be bridged by a successful legislative
coalition. Representing larger, more heterogeneous constituencies,
senators tend to be more moderate and less polarized than House
members.300 Likewise, the possibility of the presidential veto and the
Senate filibuster encourage the formation of supermajorities rather
than simple majorities. °1
This is not to say that this system is without difficulty from the
perspective of constitutional principles. Such supermajoritarian
pressures create biases toward the status quo, which may be
problematic if the baseline is itself unjust, as in the case of postwar
racial segregation when a white Southern minority delayed federal
legislative action. Likewise, some interests may be so politically
ineffective as to be excluded from even a "universalistic" system, as in
the case of disenfranchised Southern blacks or the diffuse interests of
consumers or taxpayers in the immediate postwar period.3° It should
298. See, e.g., MAYHEW, supra note 240, at 27 ("[N]o theoretical treatment of the
United States Congress that posits parties as analytic units will go very far.").
299. See, e.g., Tim Groseclose & James M. Snyder, Jr., Buying Supermajorities, 90 AM.
POL. SCi. REV. 303, 311 (1996) ("[C]oalitions will often be quite large and sometimes will
even be universalistic."); Barry R. Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective on
Congressional Norms, 23 AM. J. POL. Sci. 245,245 (1979) ("[N]early all studies report that
members of legislatures seek unanimity and are reluctant to exclude minorities .... ").
300. POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 151, at 82 (arguing that senators vote "less
along party lines").
301. CHARLES M. CAMERON, VETO BARGAINING 83-106 (2000) (examining the
consequences of the presidential veto power); KREHBIEL, supra note 130, at 84-86; Daniel
Diermeier & Roger B. Myerson, Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal
Organization of Legislatures, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1182, 1184-95 (1999).
302. For classic analyses, see THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM, at xiii
(1969) (analyzing the reasons for "serious doubt about efficacy and justice in the agencies
of government, the processes of policy-making, leadership selection, and the
implementation of decisions"); GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 7 (1966) (noting that "not all groups are organized and not all interests are
represented"). But see Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munger, Legislators and Interest
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also be noted that legislative polarization has increased sharply in
recent years, though the long-term significance of this pattern is not
yet clear.30 3 By historical and comparative standards, the two parties
are still more similar than different and divisions in legislative voting
reflect disagreements only on the margins of the contemporary
political consensus, and thus the consequences of even majoritarian
politics are relatively small." 4 At the same time, the polarization of
the parties clearly contributed to the impeachment of Bill Clinton and
interests that have become closely tied to the Democratic Party suffer
as a result of the change in party control of Congress, even as other
interests benefit.30 5
The political system is imperfect, but there is substantial reason
to doubt that it has a narrowly majoritarian character. Over most of
American history, and certainly over most of the twentieth century,
American politics is best described in pluralist rather than
majoritarian terms. As Robert Dahl has characterized the central
principle of the American constitutional system: "Unanimity, though
unattainable, is best; institutions must therefore be so contrived that
they will compel a constant search for the highest attainable degree of
consent."3" The point is not that there are no political losers, or
winners, but rather that the consequences of losing in the political
arena are mitigated by the structure of the American political
process. 7 More generally, Dahl has argued:
Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 103
(1986) ("[U]norganized groups can shape and constrain decisions to a greater extent than
that predicted by simple demand-oriented group theories of collective action.").
303. See, e.g., POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 151, at 229-32 (noting that
Congresses have been "very polarized" recently); Cooper & Young, supra note 242, 268-
71.
304. See, e.g., Cooper & Young, supra note 242, at 270 ("[lIt is far from certain that the
country has entered a partisan era."); Benjamin Ginsberg, Elections and Public Policy, 70
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 41, 44 n.9 (1976) ("[T]he level of conflict between the two parties
appears to have diminished considerably over time."); Daniel J. Parks, Partisan Voting
Holds Steady, 57 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2975,2975 (Dec. 11, 1999) (noting that "the differences
on many big issues between the parties have actually narrowed in recent years"); Keith T.
Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Patterns of Congressional Voting, 35 AM. J. POL. Sci. 228,
268 (1991) ("[T]he range of potential policy change has been sharply reduced .... [T]he
long-term, more relevant pattern has been toward a national consensus.").
305. See, e.g., CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS 207-43 (1995)
(discussing the future of Congressional representation of black interests).
306. ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 329 (1967);
see also PERETTI, supra note 221, at 209-25 (describing the pluralist theory of American
democracy and noting its critiques).
307. See generally Richard Bellamy, The Political Form of the Constitution: The
Separation of Powers, Rights, and Representative Democracy, 44 POL. STUD. 436, 437-40
(1996) (structural features of constitutionalism encourage moderation); Juliet A. Williams,
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In a sense, what we ordinarily describe as democratic
"politics" is merely the chaff. It is the surface manifestation,
representing superficial conflicts. Prior to politics, beneath
it, enveloping it, restricting it, conditioning it, is the
underlying consensus on policy that usually exists in the
society among a predominant portion of the politically
active members 0
Democratic politics occurs at the margins of a general political
consensus, with judicial review being exercised at the margins of that
margin. The quality of American political decisions depends far more
on the quality of that basic consensus than on the will of narrow
majorities.
The countermajoritarian framework is problematic for analytical
as well as empirical reasons. It tends to assume that there is an
inherent antagonism between populism and principle and that the
vindication of political and constitutional principle requires the
rejection of majority will 0 9 Such a framework obscures more than it
enlightens. It relies on a model of an externalized Constitution that
imposes itself on political actors through some independent third
party. But the Constitution is not an external force, an alien yoke
handed down by some imperial power. It is, after all, our
Constitution. "We the people" authorize it, and it constitutes us as a
nation. It is most effective and meaningful to the extent that it has
been internalized, shaping our debates from inside politics rather than
constraining them from outside politics. James Madison thought this
was likely to be the most significant value of a constitution, in part
because he doubted whether, in a democracy, there could be an
effective political force outside the majority 1 The colonial charters
had been most useful as a public "standard" and a "signal for rousing
[and] uniting the superior force of the community." '' Likewise, the
hope of the Constitution lay in the possibility that it would become
"incorporated with the national sentiment. 3 1 a  When Franklin
The Forgotten Check: On the Meaning of Limited Government in a Constitutional
Democracy, 6-13 (undated) (unpublished paper on file with the author) (same).
308. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 132 (1956).
309. It may also be the case that the vindication of correct constitutional principles
requires the rejection of political principles embraced by political majorities. Such
conflicts, however, raise very different questions than the posited conflict between a
legislature concerned only with utilitarian majority interests and a judiciary concerned
with genuine questions of justice. See infra notes 340-47 and accompanying text.
310. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 THE




NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Roosevelt advised his radio audience that "[l]ike the Bible," the
Constitution should "be read again and again," he was not asking
them to subjugate their policy views to the text but to develop their
own understanding of appropriate political action through a dialogue
with that foundational text.31  The success of the Constitution is best
measured not by how many times political actors are prevented from
acting on their policy views, but by how often their policy views are
consistent with constitutional principles. As William Harris has
argued, "The Constitution is binding to the extent that it continues to
make a political people by providing the grammar by which they
speak authoritatively about their public values and continues to
define the institutions by which they exert their collective identity.
'314
Before we can adequately evaluate the prospect of extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation, we must first lay aside the model of
judicial review with its assumption of constitutional transgressions
and external interpretation and enforcement. We should not expect
to often find political actors express policy views that they themselves
regard as unconstitutional.315
There is something odd about assuming an antagonism between
constitutional principle and the popular will, as this objection to
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation does. For one thing, we
could not expect such a constitutional system to be very stable or
enduring. Constitutions must exist within politics and obtain political
support. For another, it seems inconsistent with the Founders' basic
project of "establishing good government from reflection and
choice. '316  Admittedly, Alexander Hamilton and his colleagues
thought there were serious obstacles to judicious deliberations on the
Constitution,317 and Madison warned that "experiments" in public
deliberation on constitutional questions "are of too ticklish a nature
to be unnecessarily multiplied."3 8  Nonetheless, for "the framers,
313. LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 30.
314. WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION 118 (1993).
315. The evidence on public support for civil rights and liberties is mixed and difficult
to interpret. There is clearer evidence for elite support for such liberties, however. See,
e.g., David G. Barnum & John L. Sullivan, The Elusive Foundations of Political Freedom
in Britain and the United States, 52 J. POL. 719, 734 (1990) (noting "elite tolerance" as one
of the factors protecting political freedom in the United States); Susan R. Burgess et al.,
Reclaiming a Democratic Constitutional Politics: Survey Construction and Public
Knowledge, 54 REV. POL. 399, 399 (1992) (introducing a survey whose results help
"establish pubiic knowledge in constitutional debates").
316. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 161, at 33.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 315.
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reason and will are both required in a well-ordered republic. '319
Constitutional legitimacy hinged on the convergence of reason and
will, the realization of a reasonable will.
The insistence on the purity of abstract principles and a strict
separation between interest and principle not only creates an
unjustified bias against extrajudicial constitutional interpretation but
also works against a well-functioning constitutional system. In
politics, interest and principle often converge and are mutually
reinforcing. To this extent, there is nothing wrong with Alexander
and Schauer's example of campaign finance reform in which "no
member of Congress has expressed substantive sympathy with
campaign finance reform but doubts about its constitutionality" and
every member has argued either that "reforms are both desirable and
constitutional" or "they are undesirable and unconstitutional.
'320
Assuming Alexander and Schauer are correct in their claim about the
campaign finance reform debates, such a tight correspondence
between constitutional and policy views is not universal. Thomas
Jefferson entertained serious doubts about the constitutionality of the
Louisiana Purchase,32 ' James Monroe doubted the constitutionality of
useful internal improvements,32 Abraham Lincoln and a host of
abolitionists doubted the federal government's power to prohibit
slavery in the states a23 and few of those who supported presidential
line-item veto authority thought that such a power was already
provided by the Constitution.324 On the other hand, in many cases,
from abortion to gay rights, the Constitution may be so indeterminate
319. PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY 12 (1992).
320. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 31, at 1368 nA1. One might reasonably doubt
whether judges or academic constitutional commentators are any different in this regard.
See Rogers M. Smith, The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitutional Discourse: A
Diagnosis and Prescription, in INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE 218-19 (Ian Shapiro &
Robert Adams eds., 1998) ("[Cjonstitutional interpreters often feel politically and
psychologically impelled to argue simultaneously that the results they prefer are in some
sense authorized by the Constitution and that they are the best outcomes, all things
considered.").
321. MCDONALD, supra note 137, at 70-71.
322. SKOWRONEK, supra note 147, at 98-107; James Monroe, Views of the President of
the United States on the Subject of Internal Improvements (May 4, 1822), in 2 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 144-83 (James
Richardson ed., 1897).
323. HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECr UNION 99-123 (1973).
324. But see Stephen Glazier, Reagan Already Has Line-Item Veto, WALL ST. J., Dec.
4, 1987, at 14 ("Contrary to popular misconception, the Constitution already grants the
line-item veto to the [P]resident."); Forrest McDonald, Line-Item Veto: Older Than
Constitution, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7,1988, at 16 (asserting that "the original understanding of
the Framers and 185 years of precedent suggest that [the President] has the constitutional
authority to" exercise the line-item veto).
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as to have relatively little constraining force on political actors.
Political views may be developed in reference to constitutional values,
rather than hemmed in by them. In such circumstances, it hardly
seems fair to disparage political actors for the convergence of their
political preferences and constitutional understandings, given that any
other constitutional interpreter will be faced with the same dilemma.
The constitutional meaning constructed from such materials will
necessarily be political in nature, suggesting that nonjudicial actors
are the appropriate ones to engage in the task.3z
Policy preferences do often help shape constitutional
interpretation, and vice versa. From a constitutional design
standpoint, this may be a virtue rather than a problem. Political
interest helps motivate political actors to uphold and defend the
Constitution. A central goal of the Constitution was to create
political structures in which "ambition must be made to counteract
ambition" and in which "personal motives" and private interests are
put in the service of the public good.326 Even the judiciary exploits
that possibility, since those who have an interest in the outcome of
the case drive litigation. Protections for free speech are more secure
if powerful political actors have the incentive to maintain and expand
them. Congressional Republicans have an interest in blocking
government regulation of campaign advertisements,327  the
Jeffersonian Republicans had an interest in rejecting the Sedition
Act,328 and Larry Flynt had an interest in expanding the boundaries of
political satire.329 Constitutional principles become less, not more,
secure if they are disconnected from political and social interests.330
Those Presidents, for example, who have challenged the judicial
authority to interpret the Constitution have clearly perceived and
exploited a convergence between their constitutional principles, their
policy preferences, and their political interests. It is not clear why
such instances of convergence should be regarded as substantively
problematic or antagonistic to principled interpretation. Political
interest may help motivate political actors to usefully challenge the
courts on matters of constitutional principle. Moreover, principled
325. See WHITrINGTON, supra note 58, at 195-212 (describing the limits of originalism
and interpretation).
326. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 161, at 321-22.
327. Alison Mitchell, House G.O.P. Urges a Vote of No on Ban on Donations, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1999, at A20.
328. See supra notes 206-07 (on Jeffersonian opposition to the Sedition Act).
329. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (holding that
pornographic parody is protected speech).
330. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 121, at 98-104.
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commitments often do not correspond to personal interests. Slavery
would seem to be a good candidate for countermajoritarian analysis.
Since those most directly and adversely affected by pro-slavery
constitutional interpretations could not vote, presumably antislavery
views would find their most natural institutional home in the courts.
Yet, the antebellum judiciary was, if anything, more strongly pro-
slavery than the other branches of the federal government.
Nonjudicial actors were the most prominent in advancing antislavery
arguments, and there were sound political reasons for them to do so.
Political scientists often analyze slavery in the late antebellum period
as a classic wedge issue that could be manipulated by strategic
politicians to break up the existing partisan coalitions and raise new
individuals and policies to power.33' Certainly Lincoln would never
have been President without it. Such profane political considerations,
however, do not render Lincoln's passionate critique of Dred Scott
any less compelling or the moral feelings of his supporters any less
significant. This objection to extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation would seem profoundly misplaced if employed to block
Lincoln's argument in his First Inaugural that "if the policy of
government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court[, then] ... the
people will have ceased, to be their own rulers."332 Democracy in this
context was employed precisely to advance "countermajoritarian"
principles.3 33 The standard dichotomy between majority "will" and
constitutional principle mischaracterizes the nature of the actual
conflict in such debates and of the possible outcomes.
The New Deal provides a different but related example.
Roosevelt's struggle with the Court was also framed in terms of
democracy, but Roosevelt would not have reduced democracy to
mere majoritarianism. The relationship between majoritarianism and
political principle is likewise unclear in the New Deal case.
Defenders of property rights in the late nineteenth and early
331. See, e.g., ALDRICH, supra note 240, at 126-56 (1995); WILLIAM H. RIKER,
LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 213-32 (1982); JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF
THE PARTY SYSTEM 50-73 (revised ed. 1983).
332. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1990).
333. It should be emphasized that Southern slaveowners also appealed to
countermajoritarianism, in this case to protect the property rights of an unpopular political
and demographic minority. See JESSE T. CARPENTER, THE SOUTH AS A CONSCIOUS
MINORITY, 1789-1861 (1990). Moreover, no particular political position in this
fragmented conflict can be regarded as simply majoritarian. See Graber, supra note 214,
at 46-50.
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twentieth centuries often objected to the possible tyranny of the
majority, but progressive reformers also often denounced the
powerful interests arrayed against them. Both sides, including
Roosevelt's extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, can be
regarded as deeply principled and motivated by their own concerns
with advancing freedom, though each side would also denounce the
"power politics" of the other. Like Lincoln, Roosevelt insisted that
he would "restore America to its own people. ' 334 Rather than leaving
political decisions to a "selected, self-chosen few," Roosevelt
contended that he "would rather leave it in the hands of what we call
the democracy of the United States. 335 Roosevelt's denunciation of
the Court was not grounded in the anticonstitutionalist claim that the
majority should simply get what it wants. It was rather rooted in a
progressive understanding of "the ethical conception that a ruler bore
a responsibility for the welfare of his subjects ' 336 that linked an
"economic declaration of rights"337 and "human rights 3 38 with
promoting the "general welfare."339
Such cases emphasize an important point too often ignored in
constitutional theory. The principled decisions at stake in such
instances of constitutional interpretation are subject to deep and well-
considered political disagreement. In their own historical and
political contexts, there are no uncontested right answers in these
hard cases. Given such disagreement, considerations of individual
rights cannot be readily counterpoised to considerations of majority
will. The conflict is really between two different conceptions of
individual rights, and the issue is which conception of rights will be
authoritatively adopted. In this case, there are reasons for valuing
democratic decisionmaking, and judicial "countermajoritarianism"
seems like more than just a "difficulty."
334. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Governor Accepts the Nomination for the Presidency
(July 2,1932), in 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
659 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938) [hereinafter PUBLIC PAPERS OF ROOSEVELT].
335. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Rear-Platform Extemporaneous Remarks (Oct. 14, 1936),
in 5 PUBLIC PAPERS OF ROOSEVELT, supra note 334, at 478.
336. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address on Progressive Government at the
Commonwealth Club (Sept. 23, 1932), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF ROOSEVELT, supra note
334, at 745.
337. 1 id. at 752.
338. Franklin D. Roosevelt, An Address on the Accomplishments and Future Aims for
Agriculture (Sept. 28, 1935), in 4 PUBLIC PAPERS OF ROOSEVELT, supra note 334, at 385.
339. Franklin D. Roosevelt, We Have Only Just Begun to Fight (Oct. 31, 1936), in 5




In contests between different conceptions of rights, there are
principled reasons for favoring more rather than less democratic
procedures for resolving the dispute. The result is not the triumph of
"the majority's will" or the abandonment of constitutional principle,
but the elevation of democratic decisionmaking in a context in which
some, unavoidably controversial, decision must be made. In the
context of genuine and reasonable disagreement about the content of
constitutional principles, the connection between
countermajoritarianism and principled outcomes should be regarded
skeptically. Jeremy Waldron has recently made this argument most
eloquently, and provocatively. As Waldron notes, "The point to
remember here is that nothing tyrannical happens to me merely by
virtue of the fact that my opinion is not acted upon by a community of
which I am a member."" °  Waldron himself rejects the
constitutionalization of rights and the institution of judicial review
entirely, preferring that all political decisions about principles and
rights be made democratically.34' Nonetheless, his point applies
equally strongly in the context of disputed constitutional meaning and
the question of who should authoritatively resolve those disputes.
We might well believe that judicial review serves a useful function in
the American constitutional system, and yet still recognize the force
of his basic argument that disagreement over conceptions of rights
should be built into our constitutional and political theory.34
Although we may as individuals believe that we know the right
answer to our hard constitutional and political cases, as a society
there may be no such agreement. Indeed, the lack of agreement may
be precisely what makes the case "hard." Though it can be useful to
think of rights as "trumps" over "collective goals,"' the proper
content and scope of rights may itself be a political decision and the
trump metaphor may obscure the fact that not everyone agrees on
340. WALDRON, supra note 24, at 13.
341. Id at 15 ("Readers will quickly discern my opposition to American-style judicial
review."). It should be noted that in speaking outside the particular context of American
constitutionalism and judicial review, Waldron is also relatively free to declare "I do not
particularly care whether we call these disputes 'disagreements about rights', or
'disagreements about interpretation.'" Id. at 12. Of course, within the American
constitutional context, the interpretive component matters a great deal.
342. See Keith E. Whittington, In Defense of Legislatures, 28 POL. THEORY 690, 696-
700 (2000) (reviewing JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999) and
JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999)).
343. DWORKIN, supra note 172, at xi.
2002]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
what qualifies as a rights violation.34 In the context of reasonable
disagreement, it seems appropriate to allow broad participation in the
decision as to the content of our principles rather than remove that
decision to an elite institution that will then seek to impose its ruling
on, or against, the people at large. The judiciary's most useful role
may be in framing constitutional disputes for extrajudicial resolution
and in enforcing the principled decisions reached elsewhere rather
than in autonomously and authoritatively defining constitutional
meaning.45
Matters of principle should be regarded as equally a part of the
public debate as matters of policy. The search for an escape from
"statistical democracy" denigrates the significance of the moral
opinions of most citizens at the same time that it seeks to avoid
deferring to the wants, preferences, or "wishes" of a popular
majority. 46 The charge of tyranny and disrespect of morally
autonomous individuals would appear to fall most heavily on those
who would seek to remove important constitutional decisions from
nonjudicial arenas where genuine popular participation and influence
on outcomes is possible.347 The rejection of mere "statistical
democracy" requires that we be able to identify exactly which
members of our society may have their opinions disregarded and
whose votes are unworthy of being counted, a prospect that seems
deeply inconsistent with the liberal commitment of giving each
individual "equal concern and respect."m As Lincoln argued, if the
344. See WALDRON, supra note 24, at 12 ("We cannot play trumps if we disagree about
the suits. Or if we do, we are open to what I regard as the unanswerable cynicism of
Thomas Hobbes in the motto of this book: for people to demand that we treat their theory
of rights as the one that is to prevail is 'as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play
after trump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suit whereof they have most
in their hand.' ").
345. Richard Pildes has usefully questioned the rights-as-trumps metaphor, arguing
that the judiciary and rights discourse is better understood as channeling political
reasoning in constitutionally desirable ways. Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are Not
Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
725,727-33 (1998).
346. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 34, at 20.
347. "[Tjhe right to participate has less to do with a certain minimum prospect of
decisive impact and more to do with avoiding the insult, dishonour, or denigration that is
involved when one person's views are treated as of less account than the views of others
on a matter that affects him as well as others." WALDRON, supra note 24, at 238 (footnote
omitted). Cf. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 34, at 344 ("[1Individual citizens
can in fact exercise the moral responsibilities of citizenship better when final decisions
involving constitutional values are removed from ordinary politics and assigned to
courts.").
348. DWORKIN, supra note 172, at 180.
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people are "to be their own rulers," 9 then extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation must carry some authority.
Extrajudicial constitutional interpretation happens all the time?"
Sometimes it is implicit or indirect. Sometimes the process is explicit
and resembles judicial deliberations on constitutional meaning.
Sometimes it is explicit but diverges sharply from judicial norms of
interpretive practice. Occasionally extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation produces results similar in form to those produced by
the courts-articulated and codified rules and standards.3
Oftentimes, extrajudicial constitutional settlements do not look or
operate at all like judicial settlements. Extrajudicial efforts may rely
on building institutions and coalitions, shaping public opinion, and
allocating political costs so as to settle a constitutional dispute. These
are the means by which questions are settled in the political arena,
and they are employed in constitutional as well as policy disputes.
The judiciary has a useful role to play in the constitutional
system, but so do other political institutions. Attacks on extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation and defenses of judicial supremacy have
too often proceeded by painting unrealistically optimistic pictures of
the courts, denigrating nonjudicial actors, and neglecting to place
constitutional interpretation into a comparative institutional context.
As Thomas Reed Powell long ago noted:
Immortal principles fly their standards in judicial opinions,
yes. But so they do in the common every-day talk of the
butcher and banker, of the suffragist and the anti-suffragist,
the pacifist and the militarist, the Socialist and the
individualist. Arguments from expediency to reinforce the
immortal principles will be found in judicial opinions as they
are heard on the hustings. And there are judges who find no
349. LINCOLN, supra note 51, at 586.
350. Case studies include: WHITTINGTON, supra note 104; BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE
THE PEOPLE (1998); MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD (1998); BURGESS, supra
note 17; JAMES W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION (1979); DEVINS, supra note 17;
DINAN, supra note 143; CURRIE, supra note 8; FISHER, supra note 205; FISHER, supra
note 17; MOORE, supra note 105; DONALD MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1966); JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987).
351. This seems to be an important feature of constitutional interpretation for many
advocates of judicial supremacy. E.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 171, at 93-97 ("[T]he
judiciary's written opinions announce constitutional standards, permitting government to
know what it must do to act constitutionally."). But the Constitution may have "concrete
meaning" for political actors even without the benefit of judicial opinions.
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immortal principles, who conceive their task to be that of
making wise adjustments amid competing considerations.5 2
The normative case against extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation has been built on shaky analytical and empirical
foundations. This Article has sought to probe those foundations a bit
and suggest that the case against extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation is not as strong as many constitutional scholars seem to
assume.
Judicial review is an institutional and historical reality, regardless
of any academic critiques directed against it. Likewise, judicial
supremacy, at least in the strong form sometimes envisioned by the
Court and commentators, is unlikely to ever exist in practice. The
courts are not the exclusive interpreters of the Constitution, and often
are not its ultimate or most authoritative interpreters either. Even so,
a reconsideration of the normative case for and against extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation is theoretically useful and has
implications for political practice. This is most especially the case
because judicial supremacy is better conceptualized as existing on a
continuum of interpretive authority. The authority to interpret the
Constitution is shared by multiple institutions and actors within our
political system, and tends to flow among them over time rather than
remain fixed in a stable hierarchical or segmented distribution. The
question is less whether we should have extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation, than how we should evaluate it and how various
constitutional interpreters should relate to one another as they
engage in their common task.
The debate over extrajudicial constitutional interpretation can be
a useful angle for reconsidering questions of judicial deference and
judicial activism that have been central to constitutional theory for
most of the twentieth century. Once we recognize that extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation can co-exist with judicial review, then
the normative case for and against extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation primarily goes to the question of how much deference
the judiciary should show to other political actors in formulating
doctrine and evaluating the constitutionality of legislation and how
much deference nonjudicial actors should show the judiciary in
articulating constitutional understandings and taking political actions.
This is not entirely surprising since many of the contemporary
defenses of judicial supremacy can best be found in arguments
352. Thomas Reed Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 15 J. PHIL.
PSYCHOL. & SCI. METH. 645,647-48 (1918).
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favoring judicial activism. 35 3  Focusing on the problem of judicial
supremacy rather than the problem of judicial activism, however,
usefully emphasizes both the contested nature of constitutional
interpretation and the political issue of comparative institutional
competence. The judicial activism debate tends to focus on whether
the judiciary has gotten the substantive constitutional questions at
issue right, but has tended to downplay the fact that reasonable
people disagree wildly on the answers to those questions. Once we
recognize that the world is filled not merely with wrongs to be righted
but with disagreements about what constitutes a wrong, then the
proper scope of judicial deference becomes a more complicated issue.
The possibility of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation suggests
that our concern should not simply be with identifying the best
method for interpreting the Constitution, but with grappling with how
we should proceed given that we do not agree on how best to
interpret the Constitution or on what particular interpretations flow
out of our methodologies.
Normative arguments regarding extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation may well be relevant to our constitutional practiceP 4
Questioning judicial supremacy will necessarily seem "quixotic" if it is
understood primarily as an attack on Marbury itself or as a defense of
presidential lawlessness .3 5  Although Marbury, and perhaps even
Cooper, may be sacrosanct, the use of Marbury and Cooper to justify
active judicial intervention in matters of highly contested
constitutional meaning is not. As Robert Cover reminded us, judicial
constitutional interpretations have a "jurispathic" quality, suppressing
353. See discussion in supra notes 248-64 and accompanying text. The converse is not
usually true in the contemporary context, however. Modem critiques of judicial activism
are more likely to accuse judges of encroaching on policy and political disputes rather than
of making constitutional decisions better made outside the courts. See, e.g., ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 11 (1990) (criticizing "[t]he judicial assumption of
ultimate legislative power"); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 73 (1941) (the Lochner Court had not only taken control of constitutional
interpretation, "but it had also taken control of a large and rapidly expanding sphere of
policy"). Focusing on the possibility of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation may
provide better grounds for critiquing certain forms of judicial activism.
354. It might be noted that such normative arguments also have an effect on how we
understand our constitutional practice. Normative arguments against extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation, for example, have helped obscure the historical reality of
extensive extrajudicial constitutional interpretation. The institutional questions remain, in
Dworkin's words, a "mysterious matter" precisely because our prior normative theories
discourage us from investigating such mysteries. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note
34, at 34.
355. Richard A. Posner, Appeal and Consent, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 16, 1999, at 37
(review of Mark Tushnet's TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS).
2002]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
alternative understandings of our foundational principles and
traditions.356 It is this quality of judicial interpretation that should be
of central concern to debates over extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation. Debates over judicial supremacy join the mainstream
of twentieth-century constitutional theory by asking how the practice
of judicial review should be conducted. If contemporary
constitutional theory is, as Richard Posner has asserted, "the effort to
develop a generally accepted theory to guide the interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States,' 357 then the degree of deference
owed among various constitutional interpreters is at least as relevant
to that project as debates over textualism or originalism or
republicanism.
A reconsideration of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation
also moves beyond the narrow task of guiding judges. It focuses our
attention not only on how judges should interpret the Constitution,
but also on how nonjudicial actors should and do interpret the
Constitution. Extrajudicial constitutional interpretation is valuable in
part because it encourages a constitutional sensibility among political
actors. Nonjudicial political actors should not be content to delegate
the task of understanding and preserving our most fundamental
political values and commitments to a single specialized institution.
They should be encouraged to assume their own responsibility for
maintaining constitutional government. They should be expected to
grapple with matters of principle and not simply register the
"occurrent preferences" of constituents 58 We should be equally
concerned with a President writing to a legislator, as Franklin
Roosevelt did, that "all doubts should be resolved in favor of the bill,
leaving to the courts, in an orderly fashion, the ultimate question of
constitutionality," as with a President threatening to pack the Court
with his own partisans or questioning the precedential value of a
judicial decision.5 9 Constitutional values can hardly be regarded as
any more secure in the former case than in the latter. Political actors
can be expected to regard the Constitution in anything other than
purely instrumental terms only if extrajudicial constitutional
356. Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW
138-44 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1993).
357. Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998).
358. Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword.: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1979).
359. 4 PUBLIC PAPERS OF ROOSEVELT, supra note 334, at 298.
[Vol. 80850
EXTRAJUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
interpretation is taken seriously and valued.3 60  A constitutional
theory that can incorporate extrajudicial constitutional interpretation
should tell us not only what the Constitution means, but also how
constitutionally conscientious political actors should behave.
Removing the objections to extrajudicial constitutional interpretation
is a necessary starting point for developing such a broader theoretical
agenda.
360. See BURGESS, supra note 17, at 1-27; Devins & Fisher, supra note 121, at 98-104
(arguing that in a regime of judicial supremacy "the Constitution would diminish in value
and stature").
2002]
852 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
